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From International Sanitary
Conventions to Global
Health Security: The New
International Health
Regulations
David P. Fidler*

Abstract
In May 2005, the World Health Organization adopted the new International Health
Regulations (IHR), which constitute one of the most radical and far-reaching changes
to international law on public health since the beginning of international health cooperation in the mid-nineteenth century. This article comprehensively analyses the
new IHR by examining the history of international law on infectious disease
control, the IHR revision process, the substantive changes contained in the new
IHR and concerns regarding the future of the new IHR. The article demonstrates
why the new IHR constitute a seminal event in the relationship between international
law and public health and send messages about how human societies should govern
their vulnerabilities to serious, acute disease events in the twenty-first century.

I. Introduction
In May 2005, the World Health Assembly (WI-IA), the main policy-making organ of the
World Health Organization (WHO), adopted the new International Health Regulations
(IHR).' The WHA's adoption of the new IHR brought to a close the process of revising
the IHR, which began in 1995.2 Since the outbreak of Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome

Professor of Law and Harry T. Ice Faculty Fellow, Indiana University School of Law-Bloomington; Senior
Scholar, Center for Law and the Public's Health, Georgetown and Johns Hopkins Universities (email:
dfidler@indiana.edu). This article is based on a paper originally prepared for the International Conference on
International Law in Public Health: Reflections on the International Health Regulations Revision and Future
Implementation, sponsored by the National Taiwan University College of Law and College of Public Health,
Taipei, 7-8 January 2005.

World Health Assembly, Revision of the International Health Regulations, WHA58.3, 23 May 2005 (hereinafter
IHR 2005).
2

World Health Assembly, Revision and Updating of the International Health Regulations, WHA48.7, 12 May
1995 (hereinafter WHA Resolution 48.7).
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(SARS) in 2003 in China and elsewhere, the revision of the IHR became a closely watched
and often controversial international legal reform effort. Public health experts also argued
that the new IHR were urgently needed to help protect "the global village from pandemic
influenza" in light of concerns about the potential for avian influenza outbreaks in Asia to
become epidemics fuelled by human-to-human transmission. 3 Some sense of the larger
importance attributed to adoption of the new IHR can be found in the UN SecretaryGeneral's identification of the revision of the IHR as a global priority in his vision for achieving "larger freedom" for the peoples of the world. 4 Whether the new IHR live up to expectations remains, of course, to be seen. What is clear is that the new IHR constitute one of the
most radical and far-reaching changes in international law on public health since the beginning of international health co-operation in the mid-nineteenth century.
International law affecting public health has experienced significant innovations and
changes in the past, including the development of the international human right to
health,5 the growth of international environmental law 6 and the establishment of the
World Trade Organization (WTO).7 The new IHR represent a seminal event in the long
relationship between international law and public health for two reasons. First, the new
IHR transform in a revolutionary way the traditional international legal approach informing
the old IHR. This approach originated in the mid-nineteenth century and remained substantively consistent from that time until the new IHR's adoption. The new IHR not
only radically break from the traditional strategy but they also proclaim its effective death.
Secondly, how the new IHR differ from the traditional approach reveals a governance
strategy unprecedented in the history of international law and public health. This article
examines the manner in which the new IHR create a strategy and framework for integrated,
flexible and forward-looking governance for addressing serious threats to public health. The
new IHR engage State and non-State actors, address numerous public health threats and
draw together objectives found in multiple international legal regimes-specifically those
concerning infectious disease control, human rights, trade, environmental protection and
security-and configure them in a way that has no precedent in international law on
public health. The manner in which the new IHR involve a range of actors, apply to
3 Angus Nicoll et al, Proposed New International Health Regulations, 330 British Medical Journal (2005), 321.
4

UN Secretary-General, In Larger Freedom: Towards Development, Security and Human Rights for All: Report
of the Secretary-General, A/59/2005, 21 March 2005, para.64 (hereinafter In Larger Freedom).

5

Since the Constitution of the World Health Organization proclaimed in 1948 that the enjoyment of the highest
attainable standard of health is a fundamental human right (WHO Const., preamble), the "right to health" has
played an important role in international co-operation on public health. For an analysis of the right to health, see
Brigit C. A. Toebes, The Right to Health in International Law (1999).

6

A great deal of international environmental law seeks to protect human health and thus contributes to efforts
made in other areas to promote and protect population health from disease threats. See, e.g. David P. Fidler,
Challenges to Humanity's Health: The Contributions of International Environmental Law to National and
Global Public Health, 31 Environmental Law Reporter (2001), 10048.

7

Since its establishment in 1995, the WTO has had an intense and contentious relationship with international
efforts on public health. On the intersection between international trade law under the WTO and public
health, see World Health Organization and World Trade Organization, WTO Agreements and Public Health:
A Joint Study by the WHO and WTO Secretariat (2002).
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diverse health threats and incorporate public health, economic, human rights, environmental
and security concerns reveals an approach to global governance that echoes constitutional law
perhaps more than international law. 8 These echoes reinforce the argument that the new
IHR exhibit features that make their adoption by the WHA a historic moment for public
health and international law.
My analysis proceeds in four parts. First, I examine the historical development and demise
of the traditional international legal strategy reflected in the old IHR.9 This background is
essential for understanding how radical and far-reaching the new IHR are. I organize the historical analysis in three parts that respectively explore the rise, fall and death of the traditional
international legal approach to international infectious disease control.
Secondly, I describe the stages of the IHR revision process and analyse the substantive
changes WHO considered, refined and included in its proposals for revising the IHR.'0
The description of the IHR revision process allows the reader to see how the radical substance
of the new IHR emerged. Thirdly, the article analyses the major substantive changes contained in the new IHR. 11 I organize these changes around the themes of scope, sovereignty
and synthesis in order to communicate how dramatically the new IHR differ from their
international legal predecessors.
The article's final part steps back from the new IHR to consider the broader implications
of the new rules for public health and international law.1 2 Although radical and far-reaching,
the new IHR confront troubling issues that deserve attention. Among these issues is the
limited impact the new IHR might have on the underlying factors driving the potential
emergence of public health threats. In addition, the contribution of the new IHR to
addressing existing disease problems, particularly the HIV/AIDS pandemic, is uncertain.
Questions also exist as to whether States will politically and economically support the
radical, far-reaching governance strategy embodied in the new IHR.

II. Rise and fall of the classical regime
The old IHR, which remain binding on WHO Member States until the new IHR enter into
force in 2007,13 are the most recent manifestation of an international legal approach to
infectious diseases that originated in the mid-nineteenth century when States first began
to co-operate seriously on cross-border transmission of pathogenic microbes. I have elsewhere
called the international legal framework developed from the first international sanitary conference in 1851 until WHO's adoption of the International Sanitary Regulations in 1951 the
8 See David P. Fidler, Constitutional Outlines of Public Health's "New World Order", 77 Temple LR (2004),
247.
9 See below, Part II.
10 See below, Part Il.
11 See below, Part IV.
12 See below, Part V.
13 IHR 2005, above n.1, Art.59.2 (providing that the new IHR shall enter into force 24 months from the date the
WHO Director-General notifies WHO Member States of the adoption of the new IHR).
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"classical regime".

14

This regime contained two basic parts: obligations on States Parties to
(1) notify each other about outbreaks of specified infectious diseases in their territories; and
(2) limit disease-prevention measures that restricted international trade and travel to those
based on scientific evidence and public health principles. The connection between the
IHR and the historical origins of international law on infectious diseases is more than a
faint trace, of interest only to historians. From the earliest international sanitary conventions
adopted in the 1890s to the IHR in force in 2005, the classical regime has changed little in its
substantive objectives or the framework States used to achieve those objectives.
Some IHR trivia illustrates the point. The three infectious diseases discussed at the first
international sanitary conference in 1851-cholera, plague and yellow fever 1-are the
only infectious diseases subject to the current IHR 1 6 This trivia not only reveals continuity
but also shortcomings in the classical regime. To understand the radical nature of the new
IHR, some historical background on the rise and fall of the classical regime is important.
This part provides a brief history of the classical regime and tells the story of the consolidation, marginalization and abandonment of the only set of international legal rules directly
17
addressing control of infectious diseases.

II.A. From the international sanitary conferences to the International Sanitary
Regulations: the rise of the classical regime, 1851-1951
WHO's adoption of the International Sanitary Regulations (ISR) in 195118 occurred 100
9
years after European States convened the first international sanitary conference in Paris.
The ISR reflected, thus, a century of international diplomatic and legal work on the
problem of the international spread of infectious diseases. The ISR followed the substantive
legal approach to international infectious disease control developed since 1851. The innovations made with the ISR were procedural rather than substantive in nature. The ISR continued the substantive approach of the classical regime but packaged this regime in a manner
that differed from the way in which States previously handled the regime. The result of continuing the classical regime's substantive approach but modifying its application was the
global consolidation of the classical regime in one set of rules overseen by one international
health organization.

14 David P. Fidler, Emerging Trends in International Law Concerning Global Infectious Disease Control, 9 Emerging Infectious Diseases (2003), 285, 285-6.
15 Neville M. Goodman, International Health Organizations and Their Work (2nd edn, 1971), 46 (noting that the
treaty drafted at the 1851 international sanitary conference addressed cholera, plague and yellow fever).
16 World Health Organization, International Health Regulations (1969) (3rd ann. ed. 1983) (hereinafter IHR
1969), Art.1.
17 In 2002, WHO stated that the IHR-the most recent manifestation of the classical regime-were the only set of
international legal rules binding on WHO Member States concerning infectious disease control. World Health
Organization, Global Defence Against the Infectious Disease Threat (M. K. Kindhauser, ed.) (2002), 63 (hereinafter Global Defence).
18 International Sanitary Regulations, 25 May 1951, 175 UNTS 214 (hereinafter ISR).
19 On the first international sanitary conference, see Goodman, above n.15, 42-50; and Norman Howard-Jones,
The Scientific Background of the International Sanitary Conferences, 1851 -1938 (1975).
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The history of the development of international co-operation and international law
on infectious diseases is told in other works,2 0 so I focus on key elements of the emergence,
proliferation and consolidation of the classical regime between 1851 and 1951. In terms of
emergence, an internationalapproach to infectious diseases began in the mid-nineteenth
century as European countries struggled to cope with successive waves of epidemic
cholera.21 These outbreaks caused not only serious morbidity and mortality across Europe
but also increasing burdens on flows of international trade. Prior to the start of international
co-operation on the spread of infectious diseases, each country more or less fended for itself
and quarantine of ships and travellers was a virtually universal national policy response to the
threat of imported disease. Merchants and traders confronted, thus, a fragmented, non-harmonized patchwork of national quarantine regulations that imposed delays and costs on trade
and commerce.
The convening of the first international sanitary conference in 1851 reflected the conclusion of major European States that international spread of infectious diseases could no
longer be handled as a matter only of national governance. The nature of the problemdiseases spreading across borders through international trade and travel-demanded international co-operation. More specifically, the nature of the problem forced States to engage
in certain kinds of co-operation, which formed the classical regime's architecture. This architecture's purpose was to protect States against the international spread of infectious diseases
in a way that minimized interference with international trade and travel. The International
Sanitary Convention of 1893 expressed this purpose well in the preamble's statement that the
States Parties had "decided to establish common measures for protecting public health
during cholera epidemics without uselessly obstructing commercial transactions and passen22
ger traffic".
The classical regime pursued protection against the international spread of infectious diseases through international legal obligations requiring that (1) States notify other countries
about outbreaks of specified diseases; and (2) maintain adequate public health capabilities at
points of disease entry and exit (e.g. sea ports and, later, airports). The classical regime
sought to minimize public health interference with international trade and travel by requiring
that disease-prevention measures restrictive of international trade and travel be based on scientific evidence and public health principles. This objective produced provisions in international
sanitary conventions that stated that the measures provided for responding to the possible
23
importation of infectious diseases were the maximum measures governments could apply.
20 See Goodman, above n. 15; Howard-Jones, above n. 19; Norman Howard-Jones, Origins of International Health
Work, British Medical Journal (6 May 1950), 1032; David P. Fidler, International Law and Infectious Diseases
(1999), 21-57.
21 World Health Organization, International Health Regulations (www.who.int/csr/ihr/en/), noting that the existing IHR's "origins date back to the mid-19th century when cholera epidemics overran Europe between 1830 and
1847".
4

22 International Sanitary Convention, 15 April 1893, 1894 Great Britain Treaty Series no. , preamble.
23 See, e.g. International Sanitary Convention, 21 June 1926, 2 Bevans 545, Art. 15 ("The measures provided for in
this Chapter must be regarded as constituting a maximum within the limits of which Governments may regulate
the procedure to be applied to ships on their arrival.").
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States designed the classical regime's obligations to make information about disease outbreaks in countries more available and transparent in order to facilitate other countries' application of appropriate public health measures to means of international transportation and to
travellers. In other words, the classical regime established an international surveillance
system for certain infectious diseases and attempted to harmonize national quarantine policies
and regulations. The goal was to structure State responses to infectious disease outbreaks in
other countries so that States could protect themselves from disease importation and spread
in ways that were scientifically effective and the least restrictive of trade and travel possible.
These features of the classical regime stayed constant from the adoption of the International Sanitary Convention of 1893 until the WHA adopted the ISR in 1951.24 Variations
in the regime appear in the form of a changing list of infectious diseases subject to the regime
and the integration of international health organizations into its operation. The classical
regime only applied to a small number of infectious diseases, called the "quarantinable diseases" in the ISR, 25 which were closely associated with international trade and travel. The
classical regime's "big three" infectious diseases were cholera, plague and yellow feverthe diseases addressed at the first international sanitary conference in 1851 and included
on the list of diseases subject to the ISR in 1951. In the first half of the twentieth
century, other diseases were added to the classical regime's list, including smallpox and
typhus. 26 Six diseases were initially subject to the ISR: cholera, plague, yellow fever, small27
pox, typhus and relapsing fever.
The other major variation in the classical regime involved integrating an international
health organization into the workings of the international legal rules on infectious disease
control. Not long into international co-operation on infectious diseases, experts realized
that such co-operation would work more efficiently if a central body or organization
played a significant role, especially with respect to the flow of surveillance information
among States Parties to the international sanitary conventions. 28 In the first decade of the
twentieth century, States created permanent international health organizations at the regional
level (the Pan American Sanitary Bureau (1902))29 and international level (Office International d'Hygi~ne Publique (1907)).3 0 These organizations became central to how the

24 These features of the classical regime also appear in the regional efforts on international infectious disease control
made in the Americas under the Inter-American Sanitary Convention, 14 October 1905, 1 Bevans 450 and the
Pan American Sanitary Code, 14 November 1924, 8 LNTS 43.
25 ISR, above n.18, Art. 1.
26 International Sanitary Convention of 1926, above n.23, Art. 1(3) (requiring States Parties to notify the Office
International d'Hygi~ne Publique of the "existence of an epidemic of typhus or of smallpox").
27 ISR, above n. 18, Art.] (defining "quarantinable diseases" as meaning "plague, cholera, yellow fever, smallpox,
typhus and relapsing fever").
28 Fidler, above n.20, 47-8 (discussing early proposals at international sanitary conferences for the creation of a
permanent international health organization).
29 Pan American Health Organization, Pro Salute Novi Mundi: A History of the Pan American Health Organization (1992), 19.
30 Rome Agreement Establishing the Office International d'Hygi~ne Publique, 9 December 1907, reprinted in
Goodman, above n.15, 101.
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various international sanitary conventions operated and thus became fixtures in the classical
regime before WHO's creation in 1948.31
Another aspect of the classical regime worth mentioning is the specific and detailed attention it paid to the possibility of infectious disease spreading from Asia and the Middle East.
The very first International Sanitary Convention, adopted in 1892, focused on reforming the
quarantine system applied to navigation through the Suez Canal and modifying the regulations governing the Maritime, Sanitary and Quarantine Board of Egypt.32 Concerns
that infectious diseases from Asia and the Middle East would spread through international
trade and travel kept the classical regime focused on problems perceived to emanate from
these regions, such as the annual pilgrimage to Mecca. The main International Sanitary Conventions of 1903, 1912 and 1926 contain many provisions that address the threat of infectious diseases spreading from non-European regions. 33 The ISR continued this pattern
because it has two annexes containing 41 articles in all, addressing the annual pilgrimages
to Mecca.

34

The limited list of infectious diseases subject to the classical regime is connected to the
focus on the potential of disease spreading from Asia and the Middle East northwards
and westwards. As scholars of international health diplomacy have noted, a driving motivation behind international health co-operation in the late nineteenth and early twentieth
centuries was to protect Europe and North America from the importation and spread of
"Asiatic diseases". 35 The classical regime's "big three" infectious diseases-cholera, plague
and yellow fever-were all diseases not considered indigenous to Europe and North
America and that spread from southern, non-European regions northwards. No infectious
diseases historically common in Europe were added to the main International Sanitary Convention until 1926, when typhus and smallpox were included.36 In essence, the classical

31 The Pan American Sanitary Bureau played a central role in the functioning of the Pan American Sanitary Code,
adopted in 1924. See, e.g. Pan American Sanitary Code, above n.24, Arts 54-60 (describing functions and duties
of the Pan American Sanitary Bureau). The Office International d'Hygi~ne Publique became a centerpiece of the
operation and revision of the main International Sanitary Convention, originally adopted in 1903 but subsequently amended in 1912, 1926, 1938 and 1944. See, e.g. International Sanitary Convention of 1926,
above n.23, Arts 1, 3-7 and 9 (involving the Office International in the international surveillance system for
plague, cholera and yellow fever).
32 International Sanitary Convention, 30 January 1892, 1893 Great Britain Treaty Series No.8.
33 Fidler, above n.20, 31.
34 See ISR, above n. 18, Annex A (Sanitary Control of Pilgrim Traffic Approaching or leaving the Hedjaz During
the Season of the Pilgrimage) and Annex B (Standards of Hygiene on Pilgrim Ships and on Aircraft Carrying
Pilgrims).
35 See, e.g. Howard-Jones, above n.20, 1035 (describing the motivations of European countries participating in
international health co-operation as "not a wish for the general betterment of the health of the world, but the
desire to protect certain favoured (especially European) nations from contamination by their less-favoured
(especially Eastern) fellows"); Goodman, above n.15, 389 (arguing that the motives of fear and economy
drove international health co-operation for approximately 70 years).
36 International Sanitary Convention of 1926, above n.23, Art.1(3). The Pan American Sanitary Code, by contrast,
applied to a longer list of infectious diseases, namely "[p]lague, cholera, yellow fever, smallpox, typhus, epidemic
cerebrospinal meningitis, acute epidemic poliomyelitis, epidemic lethargic encephalitis, influenza or epidemic la
4
grippe, typhoid and para-typhoid fevers". Pan American Sanitary Code, above n.2 , Art.3.
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regime's fundamental concern was lessening the burden on European and North American
trade created by national responses in those regions to the threat of the importation of
"Asiatic diseases".
However parochial or imperialistic, this concern proved fertile, as illustrated by the many
international sanitary conventions negotiated, adopted and revised in the period from 1890
to 1945. 3 7 The proliferation of treaties on infectious disease control involved not only traditional issues of maritime trade, travel and quarantine but also the extension of the classical
regime into aerial navigation as this transportation technology emerged in the first half of the
twentieth century. 38 In fact, the proliferation of the classical regime in a number of treaties in
this time period produced an unsatisfactory situation by the end of World War II. In 1947,
the US Department of State lamented the patchwork of treaties on infectious disease control
and argued that "[tihere are states, including some which occupy key positions in the stream
of international maritime and aerial commerce, bound only by the obsolete conventions of
39
1912, 1926 and 1933, or by no sanitary conventions at all".
The proliferation of treaties on infectious disease control revealed not only patchwork coverage but also procedural problems with the classical regime's development. The process of
formulating rules by ad hoc treaty negotiations proved cumbersome, slow and resistant to
amendments needed to account for changes in scientific knowledge and the speed, scope,
volume and patterns of international trade. 40 A different process of adopting and amending
international law on infectious disease control was needed; and the WHO Constitution,
which came into force in 1948, provided the new process. Under the Constitution, the
W-IA was given the authority to adopt regulations concerning "sanitary and quarantine
requirements and other procedures designed to prevent the international spread of
disease", 41 and any such regulations would become binding on 'WHO Member States
42
unless they rejected them.
These two changes marked significant departures from how States developed the classical
regime prior to the WHO's creation. Although involved at various levels with the main international sanitary conventions, the Office International d'Hygi~ne Publique never had authority to adopt regulations in the manner provided by the WHO Constitution. Further, the
classical regime was a creature of the traditional "opt in" nature of treaty law-a rule of international law is not binding on any State unless the State gave its express consent to be
bound.4 3 The procedural changes effected by the WHO Constitution created the possibility

37 Fidler, above n.20, 22-3 (listing conferences and treaties on infectious diseases adopted between 1851 and 1951).
38 See, e.g. International Sanitary Convention for Aerial Navigation, 12 April 1933, 3 Bevans 89.
39 International Health Security in the Modern World: The Sanitary Conventions and the World Health Organization, Department of State Bulletin (No.437) (1947), 953, 957.
40 Sev S. Fluss, International Public Health Law: An Overview, in: I Oxford Textbook of Public Health (3rd edn,
1997), 371, 379.
41 WHO Const., Art.21(a).
42 Ibid., Art.22.
43 See, e.g. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 23 May 1969, 1155 UNTS 331, Art.34 ("A treaty does not
create either obligations or rights for a third State without its consent").
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for WHO to adopt one set of international legal rules to replace the patchwork of international sanitary conventions and to revise and amend such rules efficiently in response to
changes in scientific or other factors. In addition, the WHO Constitution's "opt out" technique would help ensure that the single set of rules would be widely applicable in the international system. In short, the governance innovations found in the WHO Constitution set
the stage for the consolidation of the classical regime in the form of the ISR.
For ISR States Parties, these new regulations replaced 12 pre-existing international sanitary
conventions and related agreements, 44 and thus became the primary set of binding international legal rules on international infectious disease control. WHO's establishment also
meant that the single set of infectious disease rules would be administered by one international health organization with near universal membership. The consolidation made possible by the WHO Constitution meant that the classical regime, streamlined and
universalized through the ISR, entered its second century of existence with what experts perceived were bright prospects.
II.B. From the International Sanitary Regulations to Health for All: the fall of
the classical regime, 1951-81
The prospects for the ISR perceived in 1951 dimmed considerably over the next 30 years.
This period marks a time during which events marginalize the classical regime in both international policy and international law on public health. The marginalization contributed to
the stagnation of the classical regime because the only significant changes to the regime
involved cutting back the provisions related to the annual pilgrimage to Mecca, 45 changing
the name from the ISR to the IHR in 1969,46 and removing diseases from the list of diseases
covered, as occurred when smallpox was removed in 1981. 4 7 The classical regime's marginalization and stagnation contrast with the emergence of new bodies of international law
affecting public health, namely international human rights law, international trade law
and international environmental law.
Fully elaborating the reasons behind the classical regime's marginalization and stagnation
is beyond this article's scope, but four factors deserve consideration. The first factor involves
a significant policy shift in international health co-operation. In the first century of international health diplomacy, the classical regime and its focus on infectious diseases dominated
international co-operation on public health. This dominance meant that international cooperation concentrated on balancing public health and economic interests of the major
States of the international system. As the description of the substance of the classical
regime revealed, this balancing effort was very limited in terms of the public health risks
addressed and was driven by the economic interests of the great powers.

44 ISR, above n. 18, Art.105.1.
45 In contrast to the ISR's 41 articles on the annual Mecca pilgrimage (ISR, above n. 18, Annexes A and B), the IHR
contain one article (IHR 1969, above n.16, Art.83).
46 IHR 1969, above n.16, 5.
47 Ibid.
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WHO's establishment brought a new outlook on international health co-operation to life.
The preamble of the WHO Constitution expresses this new vision. The first three principles
provide a sense of how this vision differs from the objectives of the classical regime:
" Health is a complete state of physical, mental and social well-being and not merely the
absence of disease or infirmity.
* The enjoyment of the highest attainable standard of health is one of the fundamental
rights of every human being without distinction of race, religion, political belief, economic or social condition.
" The health of all peoples is fundamental to the attainment of peace and security, and is
48
dependent upon the fullest co-operation of individuals and States.
Rules addressing a handful of infectious diseases of concern to developed countries in a way
designed to protect trade between States as opposed to promoting health within them sit uneasily with the "new world order" for health proclaimed in the WHO Constitution's preamble.
Actual policy developments at 'WHO reinforce this tension because, from early in its existence,
WHO showed more interest in attacking infectious diseases at their local sources and concentrating such attacks on developing countries.49 This strategy was consistent with viewing health
in ways not driven by protecting the trade interests of the great powers. Rather than revise the
classical regime, WHO developed radically different approaches to international health cooperation, perhaps best exemplified by disease eradication efforts 50 and promoting universal
primary health care through the Health for All campaign launched in 1978.51
The second factor contributing to the classical regime's marginalization and stagnation
after 1951 involved a dramatic decrease in the political importance of international infectious
disease control. The great powers and other developed countries made significant strides in
52
reducing the threat that infectious diseases posed to their populations and economies.
Although such progress began during the decades in which the classical regime proliferated,53
48 WHO Const., preamble.
49 Charles 0. Pannenborg, A New International Health Order: An Inquiry into the International Relations of
World Health and Medical Care (1979), 343 (describing WHO's focus as discarding "in all its principal policies
both the first and second world[,] almost completely focusing on the LDC-world and enhancing the latter to a
special subject of international law"); Dyna Arhin-Tenkorang and Pedro Conceicao, Beyond Communicable
Disease Control: Health in the Age of Globalization, in: Providing Global Public Goods: Managing Globalization (I. Kaul et al., eds) (2003), 484, 487 (noting WHO's increasing interest in addressing diseases at their sources
and in developing countries).
50 The best known and most successful, disease eradication effort was the eradication of smallpox, achieved by
WHO in the late 1970s.
51 See Declaration ofAlma Ata, 12 September 1978, in: Report of the International Conference on Primary Health
Care (1978).
52 Fidler, above n.20, 11.
53 Howard-Jones, above n. 19, 95 (recording that the Portuguese delegate to the 1926 International Sanitary Conference arguing that plague, cholera and yellow fever "had been robbed of the superstitious terror that they
inspired ... [and] had been tamed."); Charles-Edward A. Winslow, The Conquest of Epidemic Disease: A
Chapter in the History of Ideas (1944), 379 (noting the dramatic progress made in the United States in reducing
infectious disease-related mortality through "the application of the principles of modern public health" and
predicting further progress with the introduction of sulfonamide drugs).
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it accelerated after World War II. Improvements made against infectious diseases by
countries owed little, if anything, to the classical regime because the improvements involved
changes within States, such as strides made in providing clean water and sanitation services,
and widespread application of new medical technologies, such as vaccines. In short, the
political interest developed countries had in the classical regime prior to World War II
dissipated.
The political engine that had driven the classical regime stopped running and neither
WHO nor developing countries had the interest or incentives to replace or overhaul the
engine because they were increasingly engaged in international health co-operation that
did not resonate with the classical regime's objectives. In fact, WHO and developing
countries pursued strategies that abandoned the classical regime's infectious disease-trade
focus for arguments linking the developing world's demand for a New International Econ54
omic Order with WHO's push for Health for All.
The third factor in the classical regime's demise after 1951 involves technology. The development of antibiotics and vaccines for many infectious diseases in the post-World War II
period created resources not present when the classical regime emerged and proliferated. 55
The availability of such technological assets produced the motivation and the need to use
and disseminate such technologies globally. The classical regime was not designed to
support such an effort 56 and was, thus, not directly relevant to endeavours designed to
apply these new technologies directly against infectious disease problems all over the world.
The fourth factor to mention in connection with the classical regime's fall involved international law in three respects. First, the ISR and the IHR were, legally speaking, failures. The
IHR continued the classical regime's fundamental purpose "to ensure the maximum security
against the international spread of diseases with a minimum interference with world
traffic". 57 Continuity in the objective did not, however, produce continuity of compliance.
As early as the late 1960s, WHO officials and other commentators expressed frustration
about the lack of IHR compliance by States Parties. 58 One expert asked, "[I]s there much
sense in the maintenance of rules if they are not observed-if they are disregarded or
59
more or less systematically broken-without any consequences for those who deviate?"
IHR States Parties routinely violated their obligations to notify WHO of outbreaks of
54 Declaration of A]ma Ata, above n.51, paras 3, 10 (connecting the Health for All policy to the New International
Economic Order).
55 Fidler, above n.20, 11.
56 The classical regime contained provisions dealing with vaccination requirements States Parties could impose concerning, forexample, smallpox (ISR, above n.18, Art.83.1 ("A health administration may require any person on
an international voyage who does not show sufficient evidence of protection by a previous attack of smallpox to
possess, on arrival, a certificate of vaccination against smallpox") and yellow fever (IHR 1969, above n.16,
Art.66.1 ("Vaccination against yellow fever may be required of any person leaving an infected area on an international voyage")); but such provisions did not themselves require the use of vaccines for public health purposes.
57 IHR 1969, above n.16, 5.
58 P. Dorolle, Old Plagues in the Jet Age: International Aspects of Present and Future Control of Communicable
Diseases, 23 Chronicle of the World Health Organization (1969), 103.
59 Boris Velimirovic, Do We Still Need the International Health Regulations?, 133 Journal of Infectious Diseases
(1976), 478, 481.
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diseases subject to the Regulations 60 and to refrain from applying unwarranted measures to
the trade and travel coming from countries suffering such outbreaks. 6 '
Secondly, public health experts raised questions about the substantive nature of the classical regime, indicating that the law no longer responded to public health reality. In 1969, for
example, one expert noted that the IHR did not apply to many infectious diseases that posed
similar risks of international spread as the diseases subject to the Regulations. 62 Similarly,
another expert argued in 1974 that the diseases subject to the IHR "are the pestilential diseases of the past", 63 implying that the IHR were backward-looking rather than geared to the
infectious diseases the world faced in the present and future. These criticisms illustrated the
extent to which WHO did not revise, update and modernize the classical regime through its
innovative constitutional provisions.
Thirdly, the classical regime's dominance of international law on public health waned in
the decades after 1951. The emergence of three bodies of international law contributed to
this waning: international human rights law, international trade law and international
environmental law. The WHO Constitution's preamble proclaimed, for the first time,
that the enjoyment of the highest attainable standard of health was a fundamental human
right. 64 This proclamation started the development in international human rights law of
the "right to health", which appears, for example, in the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. 65 The right to health inspired the Health for All campaign
launched at the end of the 1970s. 66 As the classical regime stagnated, the right to health
began to inform international public health policies.
In terms of international trade law, the development of a multilateral framework for trade
in goods-the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) 67 -- in 1947 precipitated a
shift of interest from the classical regime to GATT in connection with the balancing trade
and public health. GATT included a general exception that allowed contracting parties to
violate a GATT obligation if such violation was necessary to protect human life or
health. 68 Although balancing trade and health is attempted in both GATT and the classical
regime, GAT's trade liberalization requirements, such as the most-favoured-nation and

60 Dorolle, above n.58, 104; P. J. Delon, The International Health Regulations: A Practical Guide (1975), 24; US
National Science and Technology Council Committee on International Science, Engineering and Technology
(CISET) Working Group on Emerging and Re-Emerging Infectious Diseases, Infectious Disease-A Global
Health Threat (1995), 4; Laurie Garrett, The Return of Infectious Disease, 75(1) Foreign Affairs (1996), 66, 74.
61 See, e.g. Dorolle, above n.60, 105; E. Roelsgaard, Health Regulations and International Travel, 28 Chronicle of
the World Health Organization (1974), 266-7; Delon. above n.60, 24.
62 Dorolle, above n.58, 109.
63 Roelsgaard, above n.61, 267.
64 WHO Const., preamble.
65 International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 16 December 1966, 993 UNTS 3 (hereinafter
ICESCR), Art. 12.
66 Declaration of Alma Ata, above n.51, para.l ("The Conference strongly reaffirms that health ... is a fundamental
human right").
67 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, 30 October 1947, 55 UNTS 194 (hereinafter GAIT).
68 Ibid., Art.XX(b).
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national treatment principles, 69 embed this balancing effort in a context that was more
pro-trade than the classical regime, which contained no affirmative trade liberalization obligations. Countries whose main interest in infectious diseases had essentially become traderelated had more incentive to emphasize GATT than appeal to the ISR or IHR. Further,
GATT's rules applied to trade-restricting health measures adopted to address threats from
infectious and non-communicable diseases, making GATT's public health scope broader
than the ISR or IHR.70
Finally, the emergence of interest in international environmental protection in the 1960s
and 1970s, best exemplified by the Stockholm Conference on the Human Environment in
1972,71 helped generate new international law relevant to the protection of human health. In
2
the 1960s and 1970s, States negotiated treaties on marine pollution7 and long-range trans73
boundary air pollution that attempted to reduce the threats such forms of pollution posed
for human health and the environment. These treaties do not represent the first time States
used international law to address non-communicable diseases threatened through environmental degradation because such treaties appeared during the period the classical regime
dominated international law on public health.74 In the 1970s, however, international
environmental law eclipsed the classical regime in terms of the attention it garnered and
the potential it developed with respect to threats to human health. This development parallels the public health shift taking place in developed countries away from concern about
75
infectious diseases toward worries about non-communicable diseases.
The policy, political, technological and legal factors analysed above help explain the fall of the
classical regime in the 30 years after the ISR's adoption in 1951. In 1981, the WHA amended the
IHR to remove smallpox from the list of diseases subject to the Regulations, in acknowledgement
of the global eradication of smallpox in the late 1970s. 76 This amendment to the IHR represents,

69 Ibid., Arts I (most-favoured-nation principle) and III (national treatment principle).
70 See, e.g. Thailand-Restrictions on Importation of and Internal Taxes on Cigarettes, 7 November 1990, GATT
Doc. DSIO/R, BISD 37S/200 (addressing disputes between Thailand and the United States concerning whether
health measures banning cigarette imports were justified by Art.XX(b) of GATT).
71 Declaration of the UN Conference on the Human Environment, 16 June 1972, reprinted in Basic Documents on
International Law and the Environment (P. W. Birnie and A. Boyle, eds) (1995) (hereinafter Basic Documents on
International Law and the Environment), 2-8.
72 See, e.g. Convention Relating to Intervention on the High Seas in Cases of Oil Pollution Casualties, 29 November 1969, reprinted in Basic Documents on International Law and the Environment, above n.71, 204-10; Convention for the Prevention of Marine Pollution by Dumping of Wastes and Other Matter, 29 December 1972,
reprinted in Basic Documents on International Law and the Environment, ibid., 174-88.
73 Convention on Long-Range Transboundary Air Pollution, 13 November 1979, 1302 UNTS 217.
74 See David P. Fidler, The Globalization of Public Health: The First 100 Years of International Health Diplomacy,
79 Bulletin of the World Health Organization (2001), 842, 844-5 (describing use of international law in 1851 1951 period to address non-communicable disease risks arising in connection with transboundary pollution).
75 Emerging Infections: A Significant Threat to the Nation's Health: Hearings Before the Senate Committee on
Labor and Human Resources, 104th Congress (1995), 1 (citing the US Surgeon General's statement in 1969
that infectious diseases had been conquered and that the time had come to focus on chronic diseases, such as
cancer and heart disease).
76 IHR 1969, above n.16, 5 ("The Thirty-Fourth World Health Assembly in 1981 amended the Regulations in
order to exclude smallpox, in view of its global eradication").
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in microcosm, the classical regime's marginalization and stagnation. The ISR and IHR made
little, if any, contribution to the global eradication of smallpox-one of the greatest public
health achievements in human history. The removal of smallpox from the IHR's list of infectious
diseases left the IHR applicable to cholera, plague and yellow fever-the "Asiatic diseases",
"quarantinable diseases" and "pestilential diseases of the past".

II.C. From Health For All to the anthrax attacks: the 20 years' crisis and
death of the classical regime, 1981-2001
The fall of the classical regime in the 30 years following the ISR's adoption in 1951 proved
not to be the regime's nadir because the subsequent 20 years witnessed its death. The two
decades following smallpox's removal from the IHR's list of infectious diseases became a
20 years' crisis for international infectious disease control specifically and public health
generally. In this period, HIV/AIDS developed into one of history's worst pandemics, 77 globalization fuelled the emergence and re-emergence of other infectious diseases around the
world, 78 and the proliferation of biological weapons became a high-profile national security
79
and public health issue.
These depressing developments crushed complacency about the threat from infectious diseases that prevailed in the developed world for decades and confronted all countries with
threats they were unprepared to handle. The emergence of new infectious diseases (e.g.
HIV/AIDS) and the re-emergence of old pathogenic threats (e.g. tuberculosis and
malaria) 80 forced experts to decipher the reasons why microbes had returned with a
vengeance. The factors were many and complex-globalization, urbanization, migration,
breakdown of public health systems, declining effectiveness of antimicrobial therapies,
environmental degradation, poverty and more.81 The proliferation of biological weapons,
especially the prospect of such proliferation through the efforts of terrorists, exacerbated
82
the dismal situation concerning infectious disease threats.
An international legal framework applicable only to three diseases was no match for what
transpired after 1981. The 20 years' crisis effectively terminated whatever relevance the classical regime retained after its marginalization and stagnation in the previous 30 years. If a
77 Joint United Nations Programme on HIV/AIDS (UNAIDS), Report on the Global HIV/AIDS Epidemic 2002
(2002), 44 ("Twenty years after the world first became aware of AIDS, it is clear that humanity isfacing one of the
most devastating epidemics in human history").
78 Institute of Medicine Committee on Microbial Threats to Health in the 21st Century, Microbial Threats to
Health: Emergence, Detection and Response (2003), 6 (hereinafter Microbial Threats to Health) ("The rapid
transport of humans, animals, food and other goods through international travel and commerce can lead to
the broad dissemination of pathogens and their vectors throughout the world").
79 Ibid., 7 ("The world today is vulnerable to the threat of intentional biological attacks and the likelihood of such
an event is high").
80 On the re-emergence of tuberculosis and malaria, see World Health Organization, Report on Infectious Diseases:
Removing Obstacles to Healthy Development (1999), 8.
81 See Institute of Medicine, Emerging Infections: Microbial Threats to Health in the United States (1992) (providing the best known elaboration of the factors behind infectious disease resurgence in the period under consideration here).
82 Global Defence, above n.17, 16- 17 (describing the new threat of bioterrorism).
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single cause of death for the classical regime could be identified, it would be its limited,
disease-specific approach to international infectious disease threats. The IHR had little, if
any, applicability to the crisis of emerging and re-emerging infectious diseases because
most of the diseases emerging and re-emerging were not subject to the IHR. 83 Any new
pathogen, or resurging old ones, not listed as a "disease subject to the Regulations" fell
outside the IHR's surveillance system, so one half of the classical regime's architecture was
irrelevant to surveillance efforts for many emerging and re-emerging infectious diseases.
WHO argued that aspects of the second half of the classical regime's architecture, which
regulated the traffic-restricting health measures WHO Member States could apply, governed
Member State responses to infectious diseases beyond cholera, plague and yellow fever. 8 4 Yet,
these arguments were unpersuasive from an international legal perspective and were, at any
rate, ignored by a number of WHO Member States.
HIV/AIDS provides a good example through which to illustrate these two points. First,
WHO Member States were under no international legal obligation to report cases of HIV or
AIDS to WHO for purposes of international surveillance because HIV/AIDS was not a
disease subject to the IHR. Whether the IHR should be revised to include HIV/AIDS as
a notifiable disease was considered but rejected for three reasons: (1) adding more diseases
to the IHR's list was generally not considered sufficiently robust to address the HIV/
AIDS problem;8 5 (2) WHO Member States did not comply with the notification and
other obligations they currently had under the IHR, making an expansion of the list of notifiable diseases questionable as a strategy; 86 and (3) public health officials adopted an alternative
international legal strategy that involved application of international human rights law in
87
addressing the HIV/AIDS pandemic.
Secondly, WHO arguments that IHR provisions regulating measures States Parties could
apply to trade and travel covered more than measures to address cholera, plague and yellow
fever failed to carry the day legally or politically. WHO responded to requirements for
AIDS-free certificates imposed by some WHO Member States with the argument that
such requirements were illegal under the IHR because the IHR contained no provision
83 Microbial Threats to Health, above n.78, 34-6 (listing 25 examples of emerging and re-emerging infectious
diseases).
84 These arguments focused on Art.8 I of the IHR, which provided that "[n]o health document, other than those
provided for in the Regulations, shall be required in international traffic", IHR 1969, above n.16, Art.81.
85 Claude-Henri Vignes, The Future of International Health Law: WHO Perspectives, 40 International Digest of
Health Legislation (1989), 16, 18 (WHO Legal Counsel expressing the view that "no one today seems to
seriously contemplate increasing the number of 'diseases subject to the Regulations').
86 Dorolle, above n.58, 105 (arguing that "with regard both to notification and to maximum permissible measures
the regulations are very often a dead letter").
87 Jonathan Mann, Human Rights and AIDS: The Future of a Pandemic, in: Health and Human Rights: A Reader
(J. M. Mann et al., eds) (1999), 216, 217 (describing WHO's addition in the latter half of the 1980s of a "radically new element" to the traditional public health approach to HIV/AIDS-the argument "that coercion and
discrimination toward HIV-infected people and people with AIDS undermined and reduced the effectiveness of
HIV prevention programs"); Jonathan Mann, Afterword, in: Lawrence 0. Gostin and Zita Lazzarini, Human
Rights and Public Health in the AIDS Pandemic (1997), 169 (arguing that "modern human rights provides a
better framework for analysing and responding to the societal dimensions of health than any framework or
method inherited from the biomedical or public health tradition").
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allowing Member States to demand such certificates. 88 WHO's position was that the IHR
only allowed Member States to require the documentation permitted under the IHR.
This interpretation was unpersuasive legally and from a public health perspective.
WHO's position essentially meant that any health document requirement imposed by a
WHO Member State for a new disease, even if the requirement was scientifically justified,
was not allowed under the IHR because the IHR did not permit the requirement. The
interpretation reveals the strain the IHR created on WHO's efforts to deal with serious infectious diseases not subject formally to the IHR. Even if the WHO was correct in its interpretation of the IHR, the story does not end well because IHR States Parties generally ignored
89
WHO's legal position.
The inapplicability of the IHR to most emerging and re-emerging infectious diseases also indicated that the techniques created in the WHO Constitution to allow WHO to revise and update
the IHR quickly proved to be more innovative in theory than practice. First, WHO Member
States made little use of these powers to keep the IHR relevant to international infectious
disease threats. The most prominent change was removing diseases from the list not expanding
the IHR's scope. Secondly, events suggested that public health experts did not think highly of
utilizing WHO's constitutional powers merely to add more diseases to the IHR list. 90 These
powers did not address the lack of compliance WHO Member States generally demonstrated
with respect to the IHR.9 ' Further, with respect to HIV/AIDS, efforts turned not to the IHR
or its revision through the relevant constitutional provisions but to international human rights
92
law to provide an international legal strategy with which to fight the pandemic.
The classical regime's death in the 20-year period following 1981 involved international
legal regimes besides international human rights law. Most prominently, the creation of the
94
93
World Trade Organization (WTO) in 1995 and the implementation of old and new

88 World Health Organization, International Health Regulations (1969), 60 Weekly Epidemiological Record
(1985), 311 (arguing that "no country bound by the Regulations may refuse entry into its territory to a
person who fails to provide a medical certificate stating that he or she is not carrying the AIDS virus"); World
Health Organization, Functioning of the International Health Regulations for the Period from 1 January to
31 December 1985 (Part I) Vaccination Certificate Requirements and Health Advice for International
Travel, 61 Weekly Epidemiological Record (1986), 389 (asserting that "to require such certificates, let alone
to insist on blood tests on arrival, would be totally contrary to the International Health Regulations").
89 Katarina Tomasevksi, Health, in: 2 United Nations Legal Order (0. Schacter and C. J. Joyner, eds) (1995), 859,
868.
90 Vignes, above n.85, 18 (expressing the belief that using binding regulations to combat disease threats was "unrealistic" because such regulations "cannot be adopted quickly enough to meet the health requirements of the
moment").
91 This lack of compliance also involved a lack of enforcement of the IHR. See Fidler, above n.20, 68-70.
92 See generally D. Patterson and L. London, International Law, Human Rights and HIV/AIDS, 80 Bulletin of the
World Health Organization (2002), 970.
93 See, e.g. GATT, above n.67.
94 See, e.g. the Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures (SPS Agreement), 15 April
1994, in: The Legal Texts: The Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations (1999) (hereinafter WTO Legal Texts), 59; Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS),
15 April 1994, in: ibid., 321; and the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS), 15 April 1994,
in: ibid., 284.
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agreements under the WTO intensified the relationship between public health and international trade law. Controversies about the impact of the WTO agreements and dispute-settle95
ment process on public health and health care abounded in the late 1990s and early 2000s.
Some of these controversies, such as the effect intellectual property protections in TRIPS had
on access to antiretroviral drugs, 96 witnessed tension between international human rights and
international trade law. 97 Even though WHO started the process of revising the IHR in 1995,
the debates about international trade law and the WTO rarely, if ever, referred to the IHR,
98
which illustrates the obscurity into which the classical regime had fallen.
The accelerating development of international environmental law also contributed to the
sense that the classical regime's day in the sun had passed. States adopted many international
treaties on environmental problems of direct concern to public health in the 1980s and
1990s, 9 9 giving international environmental law public health scope never achieved by the
classical regime. The adoption of these treaties demonstrated that cross-border threats to
public health existed outside the infectious disease context, which acted as another reminder
of the IHR's limited ambition and applicability.
A final element of the 20 years' crisis that added another nail in the classical regime's coffin
was the rise of concerns about the proliferation of biological weapons and the potential for
bioterrorism. These concerns began to affect policy in the early 1990s, particularly after rev100
elations about the biological weapons programmes of the former Soviet Union and Iraq,
but the anxieties accelerated after the sarin gas attack on the Tokyo subway system in 1995
because Aum Shinriyko had committed chemical terrorism and had tried to perpetrate biological attacks. 10 1 The anthrax attacks against the United States in October 2001, close on

95 See generally M. Kent Ransom et al., The Public Health Implications of Multilateral Trade Agreements, in:
Health Policy in a Globalising World (K. Lee, K. Buse and S. Fustukian eds) (2002), 18-40.
96 See Caroline Thomas, Trade Policy, the Politics of Access to Drugs and Global Governance for Health, in: Health
Impacts of Globalization: Towards Global Governance (K. Lee, ed.) (2003), 177-91.
97 Fidler, above n. 14, 288-9 (noting clash between international trade and international human rights in the debate
about access to antiretrovirals).
98 The IHR revision process referred, however, extensively to the WTO. See below nn. 156-8 and accompanying
text.
99 See, e.g. Convention on Assistance in the Case of a Nuclear Accident or Radiological Emergency, 26 September
1986, 1457 UNTS 133; Convention on Early Notification of a Nuclear Accident, 26 September 1986, 1439
UNTS 275; Basel Convention on the Control of Transboundary Movements of Hazardous Wastes and Their
Disposal, 22 March 1989, 1673 UNTS 126; Convention on the Protection and Use of Transboundary Watercourses and International Lakes, 17 March 1992, 1936 UNTS 270; Convention on the Transboundary Effects of
Industrial Accidents, 17 March 1992, 2105 UNTS 457; Convention on Nuclear Safety, 5 July 1994, 1963
UNTS 317; Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management and on the Safety of Radioactive
Waste Management, 5 September 1997, 2153 UNTS 357; Rotterdam Convention on the Prior Informed
Consent Procedure for Certain Hazardous Chemicals and Pesticides in International Trade, 10 September
1998, UNEP/FAO/PIC/CONF/5.
100 See R. P. Kadlec et al., Biological Weapons Control: Prospects and Implications for the Future, 278 JAMA
(1997), 351, 354 (on revelations about biological weapons program of the former Soviet Union); Raymond
A. Zilinskas, Iraq's Biological Weapons: The Past as Future?, 278 JAMA (1997), 418 (on Iraq's biological
weapons programme).
101 Judith Miller, Stephen Engelberg and William Broad, Germs: Biological Weapons and America's Secret War
(2001), 151-64.
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the heels of the terrorist attacks of September 11 th, established that the threat of bioterrorism
was more than science fiction.
Treaties prohibited the use of biological weapons in armed conflict 10 2 and the development, stockpiling and possession of biological weapons, 10 3 and efforts got under way in
the mid-1990s to strengthen the prohibitions in the Convention on the Prohibition of
the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin
04
Weapons and On Their Destruction through a mechanism designed to verify compliance.'
These treaties did not, however, address challenges that the perpetration of bioterrorism
would present. These consequence-management challenges turned policy attention toward
public health infrastructure and capabilities because the first line of defense in the event
of a bioterrorist attack would be public health and health care systems.' 0 5 The spectre of
bioterrorism made the quality of national and international public health capacities, such
as surveillance, a security concern. As embodied in the IHR, the classical regime had
nothing to offer the security need for better and more robust international surveillance of
infectious disease outbreaks. The bioterrorist threat did, however, shine new light on the
deficiencies of the IHR and brought to the debate about how to move beyond the classical
regime a powerful perspective backed by those concerned about national and international
security.

III. The IHR revision process
III.A. Overview of the IHR revision process
The classical regime's death in the two decades from the removal of smallpox from the
IHR's list of diseases in 1981 until the anthrax attacks in the United States in 2001
left countries, WHO and the international community confronting a dilemma. The
crisis of emerging and re-emerging infectious diseases, fuelled by ever-accelerating processes of globalization and the threat of biological terrorism, required robust and sustained
public health responses from the local to the global level. Given the classical regime's
death, new international policy and legal frameworks were required to address the mounting threats from pathogenic microbes. WHO formally recognized the need to revise the
IHR in 1995, when the WHA instructed the WHO Director-General to begin the
process of updating the IHR to address the infectious disease challenges the world cur10 6
rently faced.

102 Geneva Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases and of
Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, 17 June 1925, 94 LNTS 65 (hereinafter Geneva Protocol).
103 Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological)
and Toxin Weapons and On Their Destruction, 10 April 1972, 11 1LM 309 (1972) (hereinafter BWG).
104 Kadlec er al., above n.100, 353.
105 Richard K. Betts, The New Threats of Mass Destruction, 77(1) Foreign Affairs (1998), 26, 36-40 (arguing for
more attention to be paid to preparing public health capabilities for biological weapons attacks).
106 WHA Resolution 48.7, above n.2.
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Importantly, WHO understood that the revision of the IHR required fundamental
changes to the substantive nature of the international legal strategy to infectious disease
control. The IHR revision would have to dismantle the classical regime, the substance of
which had essentially been unchanged from the latter half of the nineteenth century.
Merely adding diseases to, or removing them from, the IHR's list of diseases was no
longer an option. WHO was not at a proverbial crossroads with the IHR because continuation of the status quo, with only slight modifications, was not realistic. The revision needed
to take international law on infectious disease control in new directions.
This part of the article traces the IHR revision process and, more importantly, analyses the
development of the ideas eventually adopted in the new IHR. The IHR revision proposals
embody a new strategy-global health security-implemented through a new approachglobal health governance. The new IHR are radical in two general respects. First, the new
IHR break dramatically with the classical regime. Although elements of the classical regime
survive in the new IHR, l0 7 the fundamental approach in the revised Regulations bears little
resemblance to the framework that prevailed from the international sanitary conventions
through the old IHR. Secondly, the new IHR contain a vision of integrated governance for
global public health because the proposals connect public health objectives with principles
and norms found in international law on trade, human rights, environmental protection and
security. In short, WHO turned international legal developments in other areas of international
relations, which helped eclipse the classical regime, into allies in the pursuit of global health
security. Such integrated governance is unprecedented in international public health and represents a conceptual breakthrough in global governance of significance beyond the public
health realm.
Describing the key features of the IHR revision process provides important background
for the subsequent analysis of the radical nature of the substantive changes found in the
new IHR. In addition to the unfolding of an approach dramatically different from the classical regime, the most interesting theme emerging from the IHR revision process is the extent
to which the legal framework lagged behind policy developments and actions at WHO.
More concretely, WHO begins to pursue global health security through global health governance well before the IHR revision process was completed. The most dramatic example of
this phenomenon is the effective global response orchestrated by WHO to the outbreak of
SARS in 2003.i08 The SARS outbreak also proved to be the "tipping point" for the IHR
revision process because the process, which had made slow progress since 1995, accelerated
following the containment of this global health crisis.

107 These elements involve "provisions of continuing value carried from the 1969 version of the Regulations".
World Health Organization, International Health Regulations: Working Paper for Regional Consultations,
IGWG/IHR/Working paper/ 12/2003, 12 January 2004. These provisions include obligations on States
Parties to maintain routine public health capacities at points of entry and exit and to deal with ships and aircraft
in specified ways, including the use of model declarations concerning the health on board conveyances.
108 For an analysis of the SARS outbreak and how it was governed, see David P. Fidler, SARS, Governance and the
Globalization of Disease (2004).
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III.B. From World Health Assembly Resolution 48.7 to the provisional draft
of the revised International Health Regulations, 1995-98
In May 1995, the WI-IA requested the WHO Director-General to prepare a revision of the
IHR. 10 9 This resolution reflected the conclusion of WHO and its Member States that the
existing IHR provided an inadequate framework through which to address the growing
threat of emerging and re-emerging infectious diseases. In response to this mandate,
WHO convened an informal consultation on revising the IHR in December 1995.110
The consultation's report provides an early glimpse of ideas that would later become
central to IHR revision proposals made by WHO."'
As described earlier, the classical regime's purpose was, in the words of the old IHR, "to
ensure the maximum security against the international spread of disease with a minimum
interference with world traffic". 112 The 1995 informal consultation recommended that
"ensuring maximum security against the international spread of diseases, involving
minimum interference with world traffic and trade, should remain the basic principle of
the revised IHR". 1 13 The informal consultation recognized that this purpose originated
at the first international sanitary conference in 1851 but still remained valid in the late
twentieth century." 4 The first draft of a proposed new set of IHR, issued by WHO in
January 1998 (Provisional 1998 IHR Draft), adopted the informal consultation's
115
recommendation.
How this objective of maximum protection and minimum interference would be achieved
became the focal point of the IHR revision process. As described earlier, major problems
with the IHR concerned: (1) the limited number of infectious diseases subject to the
IHR; (2) the failure of States Parties to notify WHO of outbreaks of notifiable diseases;
and (3) the failure of States Parties to abide by the maximum measures they could apply
to the trade and travel coming from countries suffering from outbreaks of diseases subject
109 WHA Resolution 48.7, above n.2.
110 World Health Organization, The International Response to Epidemics and Applications of the International
Health Regulations: Report of a WHO Informal Consultation, Geneva, Switzerland, 11-14 December
1995, WHO/EMC/IHR/96.1 (hereinafter WHO Informal Consultation Report).
111 For academic analyses of the early stages of the IHR revision process, see David P. Fidler, Globalization, International Law and Emerging Infectious Diseases, 2 Emerging Infectious Diseases (1996), 77; David P. Fidler,
Mission Impossible? International Law and Infectious Diseases, 10 Temple ICLJ (1996), 493; Bruce Jay
Plotkin, Mission Possible: The Future of the International Health Regulations, 10 Temple ICLJ (1996),
503; David P. Fidler, Return of the Fourth Horseman: Emerging Infectious Diseases and International Law,
81 Minnesota LR (1997), 771; Allyn L. Taylor, Controlling the Spread of Infectious Diseases: Toward a
Reinforced Role for the International Health Regulations, 33 Houston LR (1997), 1327; Bruce Jay Plotkin
and Ann Marie Kimball, Designing an International Policy and Legal Framework for the Control of Emerging
Infectious Diseases: First Steps, 3 Emerging Infectious Diseases (1997), 1.
112 IHR 1969, above n.16, 5.
113 WHO Informal Consultation Report, above n.I10, 1.
114 Ibid., 5.
115 World Health Organization, International Health Regulations: Provisional Draft (January 1998) (hereinafter
Provisional 1998 IHR Draft), 3 ("The Regulations continue to be an international code of practice the
purpose of which is to ensure maximum security against the international spread of disease with minimum interference with world traffic").
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to the IHR. The early IHR revision efforts began to flesh out new ways of organizing the
IHR that differed significantly from the classical regime.
With respect to basing the IHR on a limited number of specific infectious diseases, WHO
wanted to abandon this approach for one that would catch a wider array of known and
unknown infectious disease threats. The initial new approach was to require reporting to
WHO of specific disease syndromes considered of urgent international public health importance. 116 The Provisional 1998 IHR Draft replaced the IHR's "diseases subject to the
Regulations" with "syndromes subject to the Regulations", and defined such syndromes
as those "of urgent international public health importance: acute haemorrhagic fever,
acute respiratory syndrome, acute diarrhoeal syndrome, acute jaundice syndrome, acute
neurological syndrome and other notifiable syndromes".117
A broader scope for the revised IHR would not improve the performance of the international
legal rules if States Parties continued to ignore their obligations to report, as they had done with
the existing IHR. The surveillance system established by the classical regime was limited not only
in terms of the small number of diseases covered but also by the exclusive reliance on information
provided by governments of the Member States. Under the IHR, WHO could not act on
surveillance information it received about outbreaks in a WHO Member State unless that information came from the WHO Member State in question. 118 Only once in WHO's history did the
Organization publish information on an outbreak of a reportable disease that it did not receive
from the WHO Member State affected. 1 9 The routine failure ofWHO Member States to report
outbreaks of notifiable diseases not only crippled the surveillance system but also handicapped
what WHO could do to respond to outbreaks.
The early IHR revision efforts proposed a way to supplement the surveillance information
WHO received and could act upon. The WHO informal consultation recommended that
the IHR surveillance system "should be enhanced and expanded to include reliable and
timely reports from other sources, agencies and international NGOs [non-governmental
organizations] in addition to health authorities". 120 The Provisional 1998 IHR Draft
12 1
embedded this idea in the text of the revised IHR it proposed.

116 WHO Informal Consultation Report, above n. 110, 14 ("The current practice of immediate reporting of only
three specified diseases should be replaced by the immediate reporting to WHO defined syndromes corresponding to the occurrence of diseases of urgent international importance").
117 Provisional 1998 IHR Draft, above n. 115, Art.I. Annex III of the Provisional 1998 IHR Draft further defined
the syndromes subject to the IHR.
118 World Health Organization, Global Crises-Global Solutions: Managing Public Health Emergencies of International Concern Through the Revised International Health Regulations (2002), 3 (hereinafter Global CrisesGlobal Solutions) (identifying its dependence on notifications from States Parties as one of the major constraints
of the IHR).
119 In 1970, the WHO Director-General disseminated information WHO had received about a cholera outbreak in
Guinea even though the Guinean government had not notified the outbreak under the IHR. In disseminating
the information, the WHO Director-General admitted that the IHR did not support his action. World Health
Organization, Cholera, 45 Weekly Epidemiological Record (1970), 377. For more on this episode, see D. M.
Leive, I International Regulatory Regimes: Case Studies in Health, Meteorology and Food (1976), 82-5.
120 WHO Informal Consultation Report, above n.1 10, 5.
121 IHR Provisional Draft 1998, above n. 115, Art.4.2.
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Broadening the scope of surveillance information WHO could gather and act upon meant
the global effort to respond to infectious disease threats would not be stopped by the refusal
of a State Party to report. Pursuing this strategy revealed WHO attempting to harness new
information technologies, such as the Internet and electronic mail, and their use by nonState actors for global public health purposes. The revolution in information technologies
changed the context for State calculations about whether to report or try to cover up an outbreak. As the WHO informal consultation put it, "in this age of wide media coverage,
nothing can be hidden". 122 In addition, NGOs were pioneering ways to use the information
technology revolution to develop a global early-warning system for emerging infectious
1 23
disease threats.
The early revision efforts also tried to address the problem under the existing IHR of States
Parties applying trade- and travel-restricting measures not permitted by the Regulations. The
move to syndrome reporting meant that all the detailed provisions in the IHR about the
maximum measures that could be applied to address cholera, plague and yellow fever
would not form part of the revised IHR. The expansion in the IHR's scope created more
possibilities that action taken to address the syndromes would adversely affect trade and
travel. Yet, the expanded scope meant that WHO could not write into the new Regulations
"maximum measures" for all the syndromes. In place of the detailed IHR rules, the Provisional 1998 IHR Draft provided that "measures to interrupt transmission shall be based on
principles of scientific risk assessment and public health. Whenever possible these measures
1 24
should reflect expert consensus opinion".
This approach did not eliminate the concern that States Parties would continue to apply
unwarranted measures against the trade and travel of countries suffering from infectious
disease outbreaks. To respond to this historically serious problem more directly, the Provisional 1998 IHR Draft included a new dispute-settlement mechanism, called the Committee
of Arbitration, that would be empowered to settle disputes between WHO Member States
concerning the interpretation or application of the IHR. 125 This mechanism provided a State
Party subjected to trade- or travel-restricting measures not based on scientific and public
health principles with a way to challenge such measures and obtain a binding ruling from
the Committee of Arbitration. 12 6 This aspect of the Provisional 1998 IHR Draft went

122 VHO Informal Consultation Report, above n. 110, 10.
123 The most prominent effort, PROMED-mail, was launched in 1994 by the Federation of American Scientists
and quickly became an important player in global public health. See Erika Check, Dispatches from the
Front Lines, 432 Nature (2 December 2004), 544-5 (reviewing origins and development of ProMED-mail).
124 Provisional 1998 IHR Draft, above n.115, Art.25.
125 Ibid., Art.56. This dispute-settlement provision would apply to all disputes, not just those involving measures
that restrict international trade. The Committee of Arbitration proposal seemed clearly designed to address the
problem of unwarranted and excessive measures because the problem of failure to notify was remedied by
WHO's ability to gather non-governmental sources of surveillance information.
126 The WTO's SPS Agreement also gave WITO members the opportunity to challenge any sanitary or phytosanitary measures applied to products under the compulsory WTO dispute-settlement mechanism. SPS Agreement,
above n.94, Art. 11. See also below nn. 156-8 and accompanying text on the attention the IHR revision process
paid to the SPS Agreement.
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beyond the dispute-settlement procedure in the classical regime, 127 which indicates the seriousness with which WHO addressed the historical problem of IHR non-compliance.
III.C. From the Provisional 1998 IHR Draft through the SARS outbreak,
1998-2003
Policy developments and actions rather than draft legal texts dominated the next phase of the
IHR revision process. As WHO worked on and circulated the Provisional 1998 IHR Draft,
the Organization continued to build and use a new platform for global infectious disease
surveillance and response. At the heart of this strategy was the Global Outbreak Alert and
Response Network (GOARN), which WHO utilized to strengthen global surveillance of
infectious disease events. Critical to the functioning of GOARN was WHO's access to
sources of information beyond that received from governments. Well before the IHR's government-only information framework of the IHR had been changed, WHO started harnessing the revolution in information technologies for global public health purposes.128 WHO
first informally established its global outbreak alert and response network in 1997 and then
formalized the network in the form of GOARN in 2000.129 High-level policy backing for
WHO's new approach to global infectious disease surveillance came from the WHA in May
2001, when the Assembly expressed its support for "collaboration between WHO and all
potential technical partners in the area of epidemic alert and response, including relevant
public sectors, intergovernmental organizations, nongovernmental organizations and the
private sector". 30 The emergence of GOARN represented a dramatic break with the
approach to infectious disease surveillance found in the IHR and the classical regime.
A number of things about this radical break help illustrate how WHO was moving into
new governance territory before the IHR revision had been completed. To begin, WHO
viewed GOARN as a central asset in its new strategy of pursuing "global health security".
The classical regime sought "international health security". The US Department of State
used "international health security" as a concept in 1947 in analysing the patchwork of international sanitary conventions that existed after World War 1I,13 1 and the IHR stated that part
of its purpose was "maximum security against the international spread of disease". 132 As
analysis of the classical regime makes clear, the concept of international health security
was very limited because the security sought related only to a small number of infectious
127 See IHR 1969, above n.16, Art.93 for the IHR's dispute-settlement provisions.
128 Revision of the International Health Regulations: Progress Report, February 2001, 76 Weekly Epidemiological
Record (2001), 61, 62 (hereinafter February 2001 IHR Revision Progress Report) ("Since 1996 WHO has
sought to strengthen its global alert and response capacity by setting up a mechanism actively to collect information on reported public health risks, to verify it confidentially with Member States and then to ensure that
appropriate containment measures are taken. This mechanism is WHO's global alert and response network').
129 World Health Organization, Global Health Security-Epidemic Alert and Response: Report by the Secretariat,
A54/9, 2 April 2001 (hereinafter Report by the Secretariat), para.8 (establishing mechanism in 1997) and
para. 10 (formalizing network in 2000).
130 World Health Assembly, Global Health Security: Epidemic Alert and Response, WHA54.14, 21 May 2001.
131 International Health Security in the Modern World, above n.39, 953.
132 IHR 1969, above n.16, 5.

348

ChineselL (2005)

diseases, the international transmission of which was closely associated with international
trade and travel. In addition, only States participated in the classical regime's pursuit of
international health security because the regime only functioned on the basis of surveillance
information provided by governments. This restriction handicapped the role WHO and
non-State actors could play in addressing international infectious disease problems.
The strategy of global health security discarded the traditional approach found in the IHR
in two fundamental respects. First, WHO applied GOARN to a wide range of infectious
diseases that went well beyond cholera, plague and yellow fever. Critical to the global
health security strategy was containing known infectious disease risks and responding effectively to unexpected or unknown infectious disease events.133 GOARN's security outlook
focused foremost on the infectious disease threat, not, as in the classical regime, primarily
on connections between a disease and international commerce. Another important feature
of the global health security concept is that it applies to not only naturally occurring infectious diseases but also intentionally caused outbreaks. 134 Global health security and
GOARN incorporated the perceived growing threat of biological weapons proliferation
and bioterrorism.
Secondly, through GOARN, WHO actively sought surveillance information from all
possible sources and did not, as had the classical regime, restrict the approach to information
provided only by governments. New information technologies and their global dissemination transformed not only the technological context but also the political and economic realities of infectious disease reporting. The new technologies empowered non-State actors in
the collection, analysis and dissemination of information relevant to public health. This
transformation strengthened WHO's role vis-ih-vis its Member States because GOARN
allowed WHO to collect surveillance information from a wide variety of sources on a
large number of infectious diseases. The global health security strategy eliminated handicaps
the existing IHR's State-centric framework imposed on WHO.
Perhaps most importantly, the global health security strategy's deployment of GOARN
produced promising results. In 2003, WHO reported that between January 1998 and
March 2002, WHO employed GOARN to identify and investigate 538 outbreaks of international concern in 132 countries. 135 GOARN-induced investigations involved infectious
diseases not subject to the IHR, including meningitis, haemorrhagic fevers, viral encephalitis
and anthrax. 136 The volume of the surveillance information gathered, the speed with which
such information was collected and assessed, and the disease coverage of the GOARN effort
surpassed anything ever accomplished under the IHR specifically or the classical regime
generally.
133 World Health Organization, Revision of the International Health Regulations, Progress Report, May 2002, 77
Weekly Epidemiological Record (2002), 157, 159 (hereinafter May 2002 IHR Revision Progress Report).
134 Report by the Secretariat, above n. 129, para.3 ("Another concern is the increasingly possible intentional use of
infectious agents").
135 World Health Organization, Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS): Status of Outbreak and Lessons for
the Immediate Future (2003), 4 (hereinafter SARS: Status of the Outbreak).
136 Global Defence, above n.17, 60.
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The gathering momentum of the global health security strategy contrasted with the slow
pace of the formal IHR revision process. WHO intended that the revised IHR would be the
international legal framework for the global health security strategy and WHO emphasized
that revising the IHR was critical for global health security. 137 Conceptually, this position
made sense. The rapid and effective emergence of GOARN occurred in this 1998-2003
period, however, without an international legal framework to support it. 13 8 The absence
of an international legal framework was not, apparently, seriously restraining WHO's development and implementation of the global health security approach.
Revision of the IHR themselves fell behind the pace GOARN's progress set. The initial
target for completing the IHR revision was May 1998,139 but this deadline slipped to
May 1999,140 then May 2000,141 then May 2003,142 and then May 2004.143 Many
factors contributed to these delays, including the political, technical and legal difficulties
WHO confronted in fundamentally changing the nearly 150-year-old international legal framework for international infectious disease control. A number of factors relating to the proposed expansion of the scope of the IHR contributed to the repeated delays in completing
the revised IHR.
As mentioned above, the Provisional 1998 IHR Draft proposed replacing the diseasespecific approach always applied in the classical regime with obligations to notify WHO
137 Global Crises-Global Solutions, above n. 118, 11 ("No isolated control strategy will work in the long run. The
only certain way for countries to protect their populations from public health emergencies of international
concern is to agree on global solutions that address a shared threat. These solutions can be made available to
Member States by including them in the revised IHR"); World Health Organization, Global Health Security:
The Revised International Health Regulations (undated) ("The International Health Regulations provide an
essential legal framework for the sharing of urgent epidemiological information on transboundary spread of
infectious diseases. Their revision will be another important step in strengthening the world's collective defences
against the infectious disease threat").
138 Occasionally, WHO would argue that the IHR provided the framework for the activities taking place under
GOARN and the global health security strategy. See David L. Heymann, The Microbial Threat in Fragile
Times: Balancing Known and Unknown Risks, 80 Bulletin of the World Health Organization (2002), 179
(WHO official arguing that GOARN operated "within the framework" of the IHR); and Report of the Secretariat, above n.129, para.13 ("The International Health Regulations serve as the legal framework for
WHO's alert and response activities"). Such claims were, however, wrong as a matter of international law.
The IHR did not authorize the collection of information from non-governmental sources or on diseases not
subject to the IHR.
139 The Revision of the International Health Regulations, 71 Weekly Epidemiological Record (1996), 233, 235
(noting that "the proposed revision ...should be submitted to the Health Assembly for adoption under
Article 21 of the WHO Constitution, if possible in 1998").
140 Revision of the International Health Regulations: Progress Report, January 1998, 73 Weekly Epidemiological
Record (1998), 17, 19 (hereinafter January 1998 IHR Revision Progress Report) (noting that the revised IHR
would be submitted to the WHA in 1999).
141 Revision of the International Health Regulations: Progress Report, July 1998, 73 Weekly Epidemiological
Record (1998), 233, 234 (hereinafter July 1998 IHR Revision Progress Report) (setting "a new target for completion of the revised IHR in the period 1999-2000").
142 Revision of the International Health Regulations, Progress Report, July 2000, 75 Weekly Epidemiological
Record (2000), 234, 235 (hereinafter July 2000 IHR Revision Progress Report) (setting the target date as 2003).
143 February 2001 IHR Revision Progress Report, above n.128, 63 (setting target for submission of revised text of
IHR to the WHA as "no later than May 2004"); May 2002 IHR Revision Progress Report, above n.133, 159
(noting plan to submit revised IHR to the WHA in 2004).
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of syndromes of urgent international public health importance. Soon after proposing this
approach, WHO established pilot studies "to test syndromic notification within existing
national disease surveillance systems ...[to] demonstrate whether the proposed new approach
to notification will facilitate the identification of and response to, disease outbreaks"." 44 Delays
began to affect the pilot studies of the feasibility of syndrome notification.1 45 The first indication that the proposed syndrome notification approach was not faring well came in
January 2000, when WHO reported that "[s]nydrome reporting has been proposed, but
the current direction is that all international public health events should be notified".' 46 In
February 2001, WHO stated that, after its interim review of the pilot study, "it was conduded
...that syndromic reporting ... was not appropriate for use in the context of a regulatory
framework, mainly because of difficulties in reporting syndromes in the field test and
because syndromes could not be linked to preset rules for control of spread". 147
WHO dropped syndrome notification but did not return to the classical regime's diseasespecific approach. Instead, WHO proposed something even bolder than the move from
disease-specific to syndrome reporting--revising the IHR to require notification to WHO
of all public health risks of urgent international concern.' 48 The idea of "public health risks
of urgent international concern" formed part of the reasoning behind the syndrome reporting
proposal because WHO had proposed obligations to notify syndromes "of urgent international
public health importance".1 49 The Provisional 1998 IHR Draft included five criteria to guide
WHO Member States in determining whether an event was of "urgent international public
health importance": (1) rapid transmission in the community; (2) unexpectedly high case fatality rate; (3) newly recognized syndrome; (4) high political or media profile; and (5) trade and
travel restrictions.' 50 After dropping syndrome reporting, WHO focused on requiring notification of public health risks of urgent international importance. WHO began to develop what it
called a "decision tree" to guide its Member States in determining whether a public health risk
1 51
was of urgent international concern.

144 January 1998 IHR Revision Progress Report, above n.140, 18.
145 July 1998 IHR Revision Progress Report, above n.141, 234 (noting that "some delays have been encountered
and not all of the countries have been ready to begin as soon as planned"); World Health Organization, Revision
of the International Health Regulations, Progress Report, January 1999, 74 Weekly Epidemiological Record
(1999) (hereinafter January 1999 IHR Revision Progress Report), 25, 26 (noting recommendation that the syndromic pilot study be extended to March 1999 "[i]n view of the limited amount of information received so far
from countries participating in the pilot study"); World Health Organization, Revision of the International
Health Regulations, Progress Report, July 1999, 74 Weekly Epidemiological Record (1999) (hereinafter July
1999 IHR Revision Progress Report), 252 (reporting that full evaluation of the pilot study was expected by
the end of 1999).
146 World Health Organization, Revision of the International Health Regulations, Progress Report, January 2000,
75 Weekly Epidemiological Record (2000) (January 2000 IHR Revision Progress Report), 35, 36.
147 February 2001 IHR Revision Progress Report, above n.128, 62.
148 Ibid., 62-3.
149 Provisional 1998 IHR Draft, above n.115, Ar.l.
150 Ibid., Annex III.
151 February 2001 IHR Revision Progress Report, above n.128, 63. The "decision tree" evolved into the decision
instrument that becomes the central feature of the new IHR's notification requirements. See Part IV.B.iv. below.
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From the failure of the syndrome-reporting proposal came, however, something even
more radical and far-reaching. What was bold about this shift was that WHO widened
the risks the revised IHR would cover to include more than infectious diseases. The first indication of this move comes in February 2001, when WHO discussed in its IHR revision progress report how GOARN could be designed to "provide information on noncommunicable
diseases and environmental, chemical or nuclear risks". 152 The classical regime had never
applied to anything but infectious diseases. States had addressed non-communicable
disease risks from chemicals and radiological materials generally through international
1 53
environmental law negotiated and adopted outside WHO's auspices.
WHO's interest in including non-communicable public health risks of urgent international importance in the revised IHR was unprecedented in the history of international
law on public health. Not only had WHO proposed to expand the revised IHR to
include infectious disease events related to use of biological weapons, but it also was proposing to expand the revised IHR so that it would cover certain non-communicable public
health risks, which could include uses of chemical or nuclear/radiological weapons. The
scope of the revised IHR was expanding to include public health risks formerly addressed
in separate international legal regimes outside WHO. WHO's concept of "global health
security" likewise expanded from an infectious disease-only perspective to one that incorpor54
ated any serious risk to public health with international implications.'
A second factor that contributed to the repeated delay in the completion of the revised
IHR involved the potential relationship between the revised IHR and international trade
law. The IHR and all previous incarnations of the classical regime had directly been involved
with international trade because the prime motivation behind the regime had been to minimize the impact of national health measures, such as quarantine, on trade and commerce.
The limited number of infectious diseases covered by the classical regime in all its manifestations meant that the overlap between the regime and international trade law was minimal.
Trade-restricting health measures addressing infectious diseases not subject to the IHR or
non-communicable disease threats (e.g. toxic chemicals in products) fell outside the IHR
and were handled, generally, as matters of international trade law. 155 Expanding the scope
of the revised IHR to include a large number of infectious diseases, known and unknown,

152 February 2001 IHR Revision Progress Report, above n.128, 63.
153 At approximately the same time WHO began revising the IHR, the Organization launched an effort to adopt a
framework convention on tobacco control as part of its efforts to address a growing global pandemic of tobaccorelated non-communicable diseases. World Health Assembly, International Framework Convention for
Tobacco Control, WHA Res. 49.17, 26 May 1996. For an analysis of the convention proposal, see Allyn
L. Taylor, An International Regulatory Strategy for Global Tobacco Control, 21 Yale JIL (1996), 257.
154 The WHA approved this approach in May 2002. See World Health Assembly, Global Public Health Response
to Natural Occurrence, Accidental Release or Deliberate Use of Biological and Chemical Agents or Radionuclear Material that Affect Health, WHA Res. 55.16, 18 May 2002.
155 See, e.g. European Communities-Measures Concerning Meat and Meat Products (Hormones), Appellate
Body Report, 13 February 1998, WTO Doc. WTO/DS26/AB/R (dispute involving European Communities'
ban on importation of meat raised with growth hormones); European Communities-Measures Affecting
Asbestos and Asbestos-Containing Products, Appellate Body Report, 12 March 2001, WT/DSI35/AB/R.
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and public health risks involving non-communicable diseases would increase significantly
the potential overlap between the revised IHR and international trade law.
This reality explains why WHO spent considerable time in the 1998-2003 period analysing the potential relationship between proposals for the IHR revision and international trade
agreements within the WTO, especially the Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and
Phytosanitary Measures (SPS Agreement). WHO's July 1998 progress report on the IHR
revision first flagged the need to ensure that the revised IHR was compatible with the SPS
Agreement. 156 WHO mentions the IHR-WTO relationship in all but one of its subsequent
progress reports on the IHR revision process. 157 A major theme of WHO's work on this
relationship was the extent to which the intended purpose of the revised IHR-maximum
security against the international spread of disease with minimum interference with world
trade and travel-was compatible the approach taken in the SPS Agreement, namely
trade-restricting health measures are justified if they are based on scientific principles and
risk assessment. 158
A third factor contributing to the slow pace of the IHR revision process was revising the
approach to the long-standing problem of WHO Member States applying unwarranted
trade- and travel-restricting measures in response to infectious disease outbreaks. The compulsory arbitration proposal in the Provisional 1998 IHR Draft quickly died.' 5 9 The rejection of a disease-specific framework meant that WHO could not draft into the revised IHR
specific maximum measures Member States could apply, which had always been the
approach in the classical regime. With WHO proposals increasingly expanding the potential
scope of the revised IHR, the question of what trade- and travel-restricting measures WHO
Member States could apply became more, not less, important because the revised IHR's
purpose still included minimizing interference with world trade and travel.
The approach that appeared as the IHR revision process advanced was providing authority
to WHO to issue recommendations to its Member States with respect to how they should

156 July 1998 IHR Revision Progress Report, above n.141, 235-6.
157 January 1999 IHR Revision Progress Report, above n.145, 26; July 1999 IHR Revision Progress Report, above
n.145, 253; January 2000 IHR Revision Progress Report, above n.146, 35; July 2000 IHR Revision Progress
Report, above n.142, 235; February 2001 IHR Revision Progress Report, above n.128, 63. The IHR-WTO
relationship is not mentioned in the last progress report on the IHR revision process published in the
Weekly Epidemiological Record in May 2002.
158 SPS Agreement, above n.94, Arts 2.2 (all sanitary and phytosanitary measures must be based on scientific principles and evidence) and 5.1 (all sanitary and phytosanitary measures must be based on a risk assessment).
159 Later proposals for the revised IHR retain part of the Committee of Arbitration idea in the form of a procedure
through which disputes could be submitted to a Review Committee for its views and advice, which would not be
binding on the parties to the dispute unless they agreed beforehand that such views and advice would be binding.
See World Health Organization, International Health Regulations: Working Paper for Regional Consultations,
IGWG/IHR/Working paper/12.2003, 12 January 2004 (hereinafter January 2004 IHR Draft), Annex 10,
4
para.1 ; World Health Organization, Review and Approval of Proposed Amendments to the International
Health Regulations: Draft Revision, A/IHR/IGWG/3, 30 September 2004 (hereinafter September 2004
IHR Draft), Arts 53 and 57. This particular dispute-settlement procedure was dropped, however, in the
January 2005 Chair's text of the revised IHR. Review and Approval of Proposed Amendments to the International Health Regulations: Proposal by the Chair, A/IHR/IGWG/2/2, 24 January 2005 (hereinafter
Chair's January 2005 IHR Draft).
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respond to specific public health risks of urgent international concern. 160 WHO's recommendations would be based on the best available science and public health principles
and could guide Member States in protecting public health effectively and minimizing
restrictions to international trade and travel. This proposal was not particularly radical or
novel because WHO has authority in the WHO Constitution to issue recommendations
to its Member States 16 1 and WHO had previously issued recommendations related to the
IHR to Member States, advising them that, for example, trade embargoes were an inappropriate way to address the threat of the cross-border spread of cholera. 162 WHO had
163
also engaged in recommendations to Member States in many areas under its jurisdiction,
including the relationship between public health and human rights. 164 WHO's longstanding practice of issuing recommendations to its Member States made the proposal in
the IHR revision process to authorize recommendations specifically in the new IHR less
radical, but, as will be noted later, less radical does not imply that the recommendatory
authority would be an insignificant part of the new regime.
WHO power to issue recommendations to its Member States connected with another
radical proposal WHO began to include in its thinking about the revised IHR. Global
health security ultimately depends on the quality of national public health systems. The classical regime imposed limited obligations relating to public health capacities of States and
these addressed capacities at points of disease entry and exit (e.g. maintaining sanitary airports). 165 These types of limited, site-specific obligations would not suffice to support
WHO's desire to require Member States to report all risks of urgent international public
health importance and to intervene effectively to contain their spread and impact. Therefore,
as WHO stated in its May 2002 IHR revision progress report, "it is proposed that the revised
IHR define the capacities that a national disease surveillance system will require in order for
such emergencies to be detected, evaluated and responded to in a timely manner". 166 This
proposal indicates WHO's interest in pushing its Member States harder and farther on their
domestic public health capabilities than the classical regime ever attempted.
One factor that did not impede progress was the proposal to allow WHO to collect and act
on surveillance information from sources other than governments. As indicated above,

160 May 2002 IHR Revision Progress Report, above n.133, 159 ("The revised IHR provide for the recommendation by WHO of time-limited measures, based on WHO's assessment of the risk associated with any
public health emergency notified").
161 WHO Const., Art.23.
162 World Health Organization, Director-General Says Food Import Bans Are Inappropriate for Fighting Cholera,
Press Release WHO/24, 16 February 1998; SARS: Lessons from the First Epidemic of the 21st Century (29
September 2003), 10 (noting that WHO stated publicly that the world response to the outbreak of plague
in India in 1994 was excessive and unnecessary).
163 Vignes, above n.85, 18 (observing that WHO addressed HIV/AIDS through non-binding recommendations
rather than binding international law).
164 WHO has, for example, participated in UNAIDS' development of the International Guidelines on HIV/AIDS
and Human Rights.
165 See, e.g. IHR 1969, above n.16, Arts 14-22.
166 May 2002 IHR Revision Progress Report, above n.133, 159.
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WHO and its Member States had already moved and formally approved this shift in how
global surveillance would be undertaken. This change actually increased WHO Member
State interest in the IHR revision because expanding the sources of surveillance data
placed a premium on WHO vetting and verifying information about possible outbreaks
to help ensure that rumours on the Internet and the global media did not unnecessarily
disrupt trade and travel flows. 16 7 WHO Member States generally recognized not only that
information technologies had revolutionized infectious disease surveillance, but also that
this revolution increased the role WHO had to play in surveillance. Revising the IHR
would help solidify this role in international law. At the same time, the emergence and
success of GOARN in the absence of the revised IHR perhaps lessened the need to accelerate
the revision process.
By 2003, the IHR revision process had proceeded, however slowly, to the point at which
the major features of a radically new international legal regime for public health were taking
shape. First, the scope of the revised IHR would far exceed anything attempted with the
classical regime because WHO was proposing to make the new IHR applicable to any
risk, infectious or non-communicable, naturally occurring or intentionally caused, which
constituted an urgent international public health concern. This step would make the
revised IHR's relationship with international trade law potentially more intense. The
expanded scope also meant the revised IHR projected public health governance at the international level into areas previously distinct and unconnected with the classical regime,
namely international law on environmental protection and on weapons of mass destruction.
Secondly, the incorporation of non-governmental sources of surveillance information into
the revised IHR's structure and dynamics allowed WHO to utilize the revolution in information technologies and to increase the importance of its role in collecting, assessing and
acting on surveillance data. The proposal to allow WHO to issue recommendations as
public health risks of urgent international concern arose also would heighten WHO's
responsibilities and authority vis-A-vis its Member States. The expanded scope of the
revised IHR would, thus, mean that WHO's heightened authority applied to a broad
range of threats and problems. The revised IHR proposals were not only attempting to transform the classical regime's legal rules but also WHO's role in global disease surveillance and
response in unprecedented ways.
The steady but slow pace of the IHR revision process accelerated in the wake of the SARS
outbreak in 2003. This outbreak and its effective handling by WHO, powerfully illustrated
the promise of the reforms WHO was seeking in the IHR revision process-a flexible framework that can respond to unknown disease events rapidly and efficiently; WHO's ability to
gather and use surveillance information from non-governmental sources; the importance of
WHO's ability to issue recommendations on outbreak management and response to
Member States; the critical nature of robust public health surveillance and intervention capabilities at the national level; and generally the need for strong WHO authority and action in
the face of public health risks of urgent international concern.
167 Global Crises-Global Solutions, above n.118, 7.

Fidler, From InternationalSanitary Conventions to Global Health Security

355

Although the revised IHR were not completed when SARS emerged and although the
existing IHR were not applicable to this outbreak, WHO viewed its response to SARS as
an application of the changes it had been developing for the revised IHR. 168 Although
what WHO did in responding to SARS did not always correspond to what it had
proposed for the IHR revision,' 6 9 WHO's perspective was generally accurate and helped
WHO make its case about how critical radically revised IHR were to the achievement of
global health security in the twenty-first century. In May 2003, the WI-IA supported
WHO's responses to SARS and called for the IHR revision process to move forward to
completion. 170

III.D. The IHR revision process, 2004-05
Evidence of the impact of SARS on the pace of the IHR revision process came with the
appearance in January 2004 of the first full draft of a revised set of IHR (January 2004
IHR Draft). 7 ' Although WHO had issued the Provisional IHR Draft in January 1998
and although it had been producing draft texts for internal review since that date, not
until January 2004 did WHO release a complete proposal for new IHR. After circulating
the January 2004 IHR Draft, WHO engaged in regional consultations, 172 took comments
on the draft directly from governments and other interested parties, 173 circulated a revised
draft revised IHR in September (September 2004 IHR Draft) 174 along with documents
explaining changes made to the January 2004 IHR Draft, 175 and hosted the first intergovernmental negotiating session on the IHR revision proposal in November 2004,176 which more
168 SARS: Status of Outbreak, above n. 135, 19.
169 Fidler, above n.108, 138-41 (analysing discrepancy between W-1O proposals on issuing recommendations in
the IHR revision process prior to SARS and the recommendations actually issued during the SARS outbreak).
170 World Health Assembly, Revision of the International Health Regulations, WHA56.28, 28 May 2003; World
Health Assembly, Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS), WHA56.29, 28 May 2003.
171 January 2004 IHR Draft, above n.159.
172 See World Health Organization, Summary Report of Regional Consultations, A/IHR/IGWG/2, 14 September
2004 (hereinafter Summary Report of Regional Consultations).
173 Ibid., para.2 (noting that "39 Member States submitted written comments on the proposals, ...

[and] sub-

missions were contributed ... by a regional economic integration organization and three transport industry

associations"). Comments WHO received during the regional consultations can be found at www.who.int/
csr/ihr/revisionprocess/commentsregions/en/index.html. For academic commentary on the January 2004
Draft IHR, see Lawrence 0. Gostin, International Infectious Disease Law: Revision of the World Health Organization's International Health Regulations, 291 JAMA (2004), 2623; Lawrence 0. Gostin, The International
Health Regulations and Beyond, The Lancet Infectious Diseases (2004), 606; David P. Fidler, Comments
on WHO's Interim Draft of the Revised International Health Regulations, 9 March 2004 (www.publichealthlaw.
net/Reader/docs/fidler WHO.pdf).
174 September 2004 IHR Draft, above n.159.
175 See particularly World Health Organization, Review and Approval of Proposed Amendments to the International Health Regulations: Explanatory Notes, A/IHR/IGWG/4, 7 October 2004 (hereinafter Review
and Approval of Proposed IHR Amendments). All documents circulated by WHO for the intergovernmental
negotiating session that took place in from I to 12 November 2004 (www.who.int/gb/ghs/e/index.html).
176 See World Health Organization, Revision of the International Health Regulations (www.who.int/gb/ghs/e/
index.html).
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than 500 delegates from more than 150 WHO Member States attended. 177 All this activity
within the space of one year illustrates how WHO acted to harness the momentum for
178
revision of the IHR stimulated by SARS.
Delegates to the November 2004 intergovernmental negotiations were not, however, able
to agree to a final text of the revised IHR; and WHO scheduled a second negotiating session
for the end of February 2005.179 To facilitate negotiations at the second session, the Chair of
the negotiations released a proposed "Chair's text" in January 2005 (Chair's January 2005
IHR Draft) that reflected the Chair's perception of "the overwhelming support which was
expressed for the general approach" set out in the September 2004 IHR Draft and "a
thorough consideration of the discussions that took place at our November meeting and
the many submissions from Member States". 18 ° WHO undertook further regional consultations during January and February 2005.181 The February intergovernmental negotiations made progress but were also not able to complete the revision of the IHR.
Another negotiating session had to be scheduled for mid-May 2005 in order to complete
the revised IHR for adoption at the annual meeting of the W-A at the end of May.
One of the difficult issues that extended the negotiations on the revised IHR involved a
proposed provision that would require States Parties to provide to WHO all relevant
public health information, materials and samples for verification and response purposes if
States Parties had evidence of an intentional release of a biological, chemical or radiological
agent within their territories. 182 Such a requirement connected the IHR revision process
with the sensitive and controversial politics concerning weapons of mass destruction
(WMD). Some countries, most notably the United States, wanted the revised IHR to
include such a requirement. Other States, such as Brazil and Iran, argued to have the require183
ment removed from the revised IHR.
Part of the concern with involving WHO and the revised IHR in matters involving potential intentional uses of WMD focused on fears that such matters would jeopardize WHO's
177 World Health Organization, Update on Recent Developments in the International Health Regulations Revision
Process, 14 December 2004 (www.who.int/csr/ihr/revisionprocess/igwgsummary/en/index.html).
178 The IHR revision process received another boost in 2004 from the outbreak in Asia of avian influenza (H5N I).
David P. Fidler, Global Outbreak of Avian Influenza A (H5N1) and International Law, American Society of
International Law Insight, January 2004 (www.asil.org/insights/insigh125.htm) ("The outbreak underscores,
as did SARS, the urgent need for WHO member States to revise the IHR to provide an international legal framework for global efforts against infectious disease threats").
179 World Health Organization, above n. 177.
180 Chair's January 2005 IHR Draft, above n. 159. Other documents WHO circulated for the February negotiations can be found at www.who.int/gb/ghs/e/index.html#IGWG2.
181 World Health Organization, Intersessional Regional Consultation Meetings Held Between 24 January and 20
February 2005 (www.who.int/csr/ihr/revisionprocess/intersessionalmeetings/en/index.htm).
182 See January 2004 IHR Draft, above n.159, Art.41; September 2004 IHR Draft, above n.159, Art.45; and
Chair's January 2005 IHR Draft, above n.159, Art.45 (in square brackets).
183 See, e.g. World Health Organization, Review and Approval of Proposed Amendments to the International
Health Regulations, A/IHR/IGWG/A/Conf.Paper No. 2, 6 November 2004, 26 (describing amendments
to Art.45 of the September 2004 IHR Draft proposed by the United States and describing proposals from
Brazil and Iran (on behalf of the WHO Member States in WHO's Eastern Mediterranean Region) to delete
Art.45).
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core public health mission by forcing it to become entangled in WMD politics. The report
of the UN Secretary-General's High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change, issued
in December 2004, fuelled this controversy more by recommending that the WHO Director-General keep the UN Security Council informed during any suspicious or overwhelming
outbreak of infectious disease and that the Security Council mandate State co-operation with
WHO in addressing such outbreaks. 184 As Pearson argued, the High-Level Panel's recommendation was "treading on dangerous ground ... [because] the effectiveness of the
World Health Organization rests on its political neutrality and the widespread recognition
that its purpose is to provide assistance to its Member States when they are faced with outbreaks of disease". 185 In March 2005, the UN Secretary-General declared that he was ready,
"in consultation with the Director-General of the World Health Organization, to use my
powers ... to call to the attention of the Security Council any overwhelming outbreak of
infectious disease that threatens international peace and security".,186Ho
How th
the revised
IHR would handle the question of suspected intentional releases of biological, chemical
and radiological agents was not resolved until the final negotiating session in May 2005
and the outcome is described in Part IV.B.iii., below.
Similarly, the difficult problems the negotiations experienced between China and Taiwan
were not resolved until the final session. Taiwan has long been seeking to participate formally
at WHO; 187 but its attempts to forge such a relationship have been blocked by China, which
claims sovereignty over Taiwan. The SARS outbreak in Taiwan in 2003, during which
WHO provided assistance to the Taiwanese, 188 provided Taiwan with new ammunition
in arguing that it should be in direct contact with WHO and be formally covered by the
revised IHR. Nicaragua proposed amendments at the November 2004 negotiations that
would have allowed the revised IHR to apply to Taiwan. 189 Although these amendments
failed to be included in the Chair's January 2005 IHR Draft, the Taiwan-China controversy
did not fade away during the February and May negotiations. The eventual handling of this
issue is also discussed below in Part IV.B.v.
Despite difficult negotiations on these and other issues, the delegates finally reached agreement on 14 May 2005,'90 when it forwarded the final text of the revised IHR to the WHA
for its consideration. The IHR revision process essentially concluded almost exactly 10 years

184 United Nations, Report of the Secretary-General's High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change-A
More Secure World: Our Shared Responsibility (2004) (hereinafter A More Secure World), para.144.
185 Graham S. Pearson, The UN Secretary-General's High Level Panel: Biological Weapons Related Issues
(Strengthening the Biological Weapons Convention Review Conference Paper No. 14), May 2005, para.30.
186 In Larger Freedom, above n.4, para.105.
187 Starting in 1997, Taiwan has annually attempted to gain observer status at WHO. Michael Richardson, China's
World Health Battleground, New Zealand Herald, 25 May 2005, A20.
188 Fidler, above n.108, 129-30.
189 See World Health Organization, Review and Approval of Proposed Amendments to the International Health
Regulations, A/IHR/IGWG/C/Conf.Paper No. 1, 8 November 2004, 22-3.
190 World Health Organization, Revision of the International Health Regulations: Note by the Secretariat, A58/4,
16 May 2005.
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from the date-12 May 1995-the WI-A first requested the WHO Director-General to
begin revising the IHR.

IV. Analysis of the major substantive changes in the new IHR
IV.A. Overview of major changes contained in the new IHR
The new IHR consist of 66 articles arranged in 10 parts, with nine annexes (see Table 1).
Although aspects of the old IHR continue in the revised Regulations, 191 the new IHR comprehensively change the approach found in the classical regime. A provision-by-provision
comparison of the new and old IHR is beyond the scope of this article, but I analyse the
major substantive changes that distinguish the new IHR from its nineteenth and twentieth-century predecessors.
The new IHR contain five major substantive changes from the prior regime: (1) a dramatic
expansion of the scope of the IHR; (2) the creation of obligations on States Parties to develop
minimum core surveillance and response capacities; (3) granting WHO the authority to
access and use non-governmental sources of surveillance information; (4) granting WHO
the power to declare the existence of public health emergencies of international concern
and to issue recommendations on how States Parties should deal with such emergencies
and routine public health risks; and (5) the incorporation of human rights concepts into
the implementation of the IHR by States Parties.
This part analyses these changes by organizing them around three themes: scope, sovereignty and synthesis. The scope theme explains the expansion of the IHR's scope of application, participation, obligations and WHO's responsibilities. The sovereignty theme
explores how the new IHR address sovereignty concerns States raised during the negotiations
on the revised IHR. The synthesis theme examines how the new IHR embodies a strategy for
global health governance that integrates multiple threats, actors and policy objectives in a
manner never before attempted in international health diplomacy.

I.B. The scope of the new IHR
One theme that remained consistent throughout the IHR revision process was the need to
expand the scope of the IHR's application. This need extended beyond the desire to move
from a disease-specific approach to a framework catching a larger number and broader
array of public health threats, including threats not foreseen. The theme of scope expansion
also covers the purpose of the new IHR, increasing the sources of surveillance information
available to WHO, the nature of obligations to be undertaken by IHR States Parties,
WHO's authority and responsibilities in the surveillance and response realms, and the incorporation of human rights principles. In addition, the scope theme encompasses the controversy that emerged on whether the new IHR would apply directly to Taiwan.

191 For example, the provisions on charges for health measures in the old and new IHR are similar. See IHR 1969,
above n.16, Art.82 and IHR 2005, above n.1, Arts 40-1.
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IV.B.i. The scope of the new IHR and its purpose
The new IHR's purpose and scope "are to prevent, protect against, control and provide a
public health response to the international spread of disease in ways that are commensurate
with and restricted to public health risks and which avoid unnecessary interference with
international traffic and trade". 192 This provision resonates with the purpose of the old
IHR: maximum security against the international spread of disease with minimum interference with world trade and travel. 193 Although the purposes of the old and new IHR
share objectives, the similarities should not obscure how the purposes of the two regimes
differ because of the new IHR's expanded scope.
As mentioned earlier, a weakness of the old IHR flowed from its limited application to a
small number of infectious diseases. The short list of "diseases subject to the Regulations"
determined the old IHR's purpose. "Maximum security against the international spread
of disease" meant security from only a handful of infectious diseases and "minimum inference" with world traffic was likewise restricted by the narrow disease range. The diseases
subject to the old IHR, such as cholera, plague and yellow fever, were identified because
States historically associated the spread of these diseases with international trade and
travel. As argued above, the scope and thus the purpose of the old IHR were determined predominantly by the trade concerns of the great powers, and not public health considerations.
The expansion of scope in the new IHR to include a wide range of disease risks (examined
in more detail below) reverses the policy emphasis in the IHR's purpose. Instead of commercial interests defining the scope and purpose of the IHR, public health considerations now
take priority. Calibrating the protection of public health with trade and travel still must occur
under the new IHR, but the dynamic the new IHR contain is radically different from the one
that drove the classical regime and the old IHR. As the UN Secretary-General asserted in
welcoming the new IHR, the WHA took "a bold and necessary step towards enhancing
international cooperation in promoting and protecting global public health from all
disease risks, irrespective of origin or source". 194 The shift embodied in the new IHR reflects
the growth in public health's importance in national and international governance in the last
10-15 years.

IV.B.ii. The scope of the new IHR's disease application
The second aspect of scope expansion in the new IHR is the significant increase in the scope
of the IHR's application to public health threats. This increase in the IHR's disease coverage
has three components. The first component involves replacing the static and closed diseasespecific framework of the classical regime with one built on the concepts of "disease",
"event", "public health risks" and "public health emergency of international concern".

192 IHR 2005, above n.1, Art.2.
193 IHR 1969, above n.16, 5.
194 UN Secretary-General, World Health Assembly's Revised Regulations "Bold and Necessary Step" to Protect
Global Public Health, Says Secretary-General, Press Release, SG/SM/9886, SAG/365, 23 May 2005.
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Public health emergency of
international concern
Disease

Public health risk
Event
Figure 1. Scope of the new IHR's disease application.
"Disease" is broadly defined as "an illness of medical condition, irrespective of origin
source, that presents or could present significant harm to humans".' 95 An "event" is
manifestation of disease or an occurrence that creates a potential for disease". 196
"public health risk" is "a likelihood of an event that may affect adversely the health

or
"a
A
of
human populations, with an emphasis on one which may spread internationally or may
present a serious and direct danger". 197 A "public health emergency of international
concern" is "an extraordinary event which is determined, as provided in these Regulations:
(i) to constitute a public health risk to other States through the international spread of
disease; and (ii) to potentially require a coordinated international response". 19 8 These
defined terms operate together analytically as a series of concentric circles, giving the new
IHR both breadth and focus of application (see Figure 1).
The classical regime functioned on the basis that States Parties identified in advance the
public health threats that would require co-operation in the future.i 99 Even with the innovative provisions in the WHO Constitution, 20 0 the scope of the classical regime's application
became inflexible and stagnant. Approaching governance through the idea of public health
risks and public health emergencies of international concern not only catches threats already
identified but also new, unexpected or unforeseen threats. The new IHR's scope of disease
application is, thus, dynamic, flexible and forward-looking, which is more appropriate
and legitimate from a public health perspective.
195 IHR 2005, above n.1, Art. 1.
196 Ibid.
197 Ibid.
198 Ibid.
199 IHR 1969, above n.16, Art.1 (defining "diseases subject to the Regulations").
200 WHO Const., Arts 21(a) and 22.
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The second component of the new IHR's disease scope concerns the application of the
concept of public health emergencies of international concern to communicable and noncommunicable diseases. As mentioned earlier, no iteration of the classical regime applied
to non-communicable disease threats, which States addressed, if at all, through international
2 4
2 °2
20
security2 °3 and environmental protection. 0
legal regimes on trade, ' human rights,
Under the new IHR, global health security is a more comprehensive governance strategy
that applies to significant international threats to public health emanating from biological,
20 5
chemical or radiological sources.
The third component of the new IHR's scope of disease application is the incorporation of
all possible sources of public health threats: naturally occurring, accidental and intentionally
caused. The classical regime's focus on infectious diseases remained limited to naturally
occurring diseases; and the history of the classical regime's development before and after
WHO's creation never crosses paths with the international law on WvMD. 2 06 Similarly,
international environmental law's concern with maritime, industrial or radiological accidents
emerged outside of WOI 2 0 7 and never had any relationship with the infectious-diseasefocused IHR. In bringing all possible sources of public health emergencies of international
concern under the revised IHR, WHO further underscored its effort to develop a comprehensive governance strategy for global health security.
Expanding the IHR's scope to include chemical and radiological threats to public health
generated concerns during the revision process. 20 8 In addition to controversies about
201 See, e.g. GATT, above n.67, Art.XX(b).
202 ICESCR, above n.65, Art.12.
203 Geneva Protocol, above n. 102; BWC, above n. 103; Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction, 13 January 1993, 1974 UNTS
317 (hereinafter CWC).
204 See references above n. 39.
205 The definition of disease in the major negotiating drafts specifically mentioned "biological, chemical, or radiological agents"; January 2004 IHR Draft, above n.159, Art.l.1; September 2004 IHR Draft, above n.159,
Art.1.1; and Chair's January 2005 IHR Draft, above n.159, Art. 1.1 (entire definition in square brackets).
The definition of disease in the new IHR does not include specific reference to biological, chemical, or radiological agents but refers to illness or medical conditions "irrespective of source or origin", giving it the same
breadth as the negotiating texts.
206 Part of the reason for this situation is that the treaties addressing WMD, such as the Geneva Protocol, BWC and
CWC, sought to control the development, production, stockpiling, transfer, or use of WMD. These agreements
paid no attention to what should happen in the event that a State or terrorist group used a WMD. The new IHR
address the public health importance of detecting such use early and mounting effective responses nationally and
globally. The controversy concerning this aspect of the new IHR is explored below in Part IV.B.iii.
207 The lead international organizations in the areas of maritime, industrial and nuclear accidents have been the
International Maritime Organization, the UN Economic Commission for Europe and the International
Atomic Energy Agency.
208 Summary Report of Regional Consultations, above n.172, para.6 (noting input from WHO Member States that
the "Regulations should cover diseases and events of biological or unknown origin. Broadening the scope to
cover chemical and radiological events or those caused by deliberate release would need further discussion");
Review and Approval of Proposed IHR Amendments, above n. 175, para.3 (noting a main concern as "the presence, in the chemical and radionuclear fields, of several international instruments and organizations dealing
with accidents and other forms of pollution that result in the release of chemical or radionuclear agents into
the environment").
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involving the IHR in security issues related to WMD (discussed below), a number of
Member States questioned the need for the revised IHR to expand to cover accidental releases
of chemical and radiological agents because other international organizations and treaties
20 9
already addressed aspects of chemical and radiological incidents and emergencies.
Expanding the IHR into these areas might produce not only governance redundancy but
also conflict between the revised IHR and WHO, on the one hand, and other international
organizations and treaty regimes, on the other.
In preparing the September 2004 IHR Draft, WHO commissioned an international legal
analysis of potential or actual conflicts between the revised IHR (as then embodied in the
January 2004 IHR Draft) and other international legal regimes. 2 10 Importantly, the conflicts
analysis concluded that the proposed IHR revisions did not produce a significant number of
conflicts with other treaty regimes. 211 In the small number of cases where actual or potential
conflicts existed, WHO revised provisions of the negotiating draft to eliminate or minimize
actual or potential conflicts. 2 12 In addition, WHO added provisions in the September 2004
IHR Draft to facilitate co-operation and co-ordination between WHO and other international organizations that may also have responsibilities in the event of a chemical or
radiological public health emergency of international concern. 213 These co-operation and
co-ordination provisions now form part of the new IHR.214
WHO Member States, thus, accepted WHO's position that adding chemical and radiological threats to the scope of the IHR's disease application was justified on public health
grounds. 215 WHO's commitment to this scope expansion reflects its determination to
209 Summary of Regional Consultations, above n.172, para.6 (noting input at regional consultations that "[t]he
relationship between the Regulations and a number of international bodies should be identified and clearly
stated"); Review and Approval of Proposed IHR Amendments, above n.175, para.3 (reporting Member
States' concerns that "[a]n unqualified extension of the Regulations' scope and of the authority of WHO to
act in those two areas could lead to conflicts with or duplication of other international instruments and the
activities of other competent international organizations").
210 Center for Law and the Public's Health, Conflict Analysis of the Draft Revised International Health Regulations
and Existing International Law: A Report to the World Health Organization (July 2004) (hereinafter IHR Conflicts Analysis) (on file with author). I was the primary author of this report to WHO.
211 Ibid., Executive Summary, para.4 ("The Report identifies few conflicts between the IHR Draft and other international legal regimes").
212 These changes are described in Review and Approval of Proposed IHR Amendments, above n.175.
213 See September 2004 IHR Draft, above n. 159, Arts 12 (concerning co-operation of WHO with international
organizations and bodies), 15(e) (requiring WHO Director-General to consider activities undertaken by
other relevant international organizations in issuing, modifying, or terminating temporary or standing recommendations), 58 (concerning the relationship with other international agreements). See also Chair's
January 2005 IHR Draft, above n.159, Arts 12, 15(e) and 58.
214 IHR 2005, above n.1, Arts 6.1, 14, 17(f) and 57.1.
215 Review and Approval of Proposed IHR Amendments, above n. 175, para.3 ("The extension beyond the range of
the existing Regulations is justified on the grounds that the release of chemical or radionuclear agents often
manifests itself at the outset through symptoms or signs, sometimes even before their cause is known. The
ability of the international community, in particular through WHO's coordination, to obtain a reliable assessment of and to respond to, potentially grave health threats would be impaired if the scope of the Regulations
were limited to diseases that were already identified as being caused by infectious agents only") and para.4
(arguing that "in both the chemical and radionuclear fields, the existing instruments are not necessarily comprehensive and do not always adequately address the health dimension of accidental or other forms of release").
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achieve global health security comprehensively across the range of public health threats with
potentially adverse international consequences. Overlaps with other international legal
regimes created by this comprehensive global health security strategy present a new governance challenge that WHO will have to manage, but WHO and its Member States concluded
that this challenge was necessary to accept. I return to this challenge below in the analysis of
the theme of synthesis.
IV.B.iii. The scope of disease application and weapons of mass destruction
As described earlier, one of the most difficult issues experienced in negotiating the revision
of the IHR involved whether the new IHR's scope would include public health risks connected to suspected intentional releases of biological, chemical or radiological agents. The
IHR revision process clearly attempted to include such releases within the scope of the
revised Regulations. In addition to the broadening of the scope of the IHR's disease application, the main negotiating texts all contained a specific provision that required States
Parties to share information with WHO if they had evidence of an intentional release of a
216
The new IHR apply to
biological, chemical or radiological agent in their territories.
public health risks connected to the intentional release of WMD agents but lack any specific
provision on this issue. The new IHR reflect, thus, the difficult negotiations that transpired
on this issue.
To begin, the new IHR do not contain the proposed article that directly addressed sharing
information with WHO in the event of suspected intentional release of a WMD agent. In
fact, any mention of intentional releases of biological, chemical or radiological agents has
been purged from the text of the revised Regulations. What remains of the approach
found in the main negotiating texts now appears as Article 7 of the new IHR, which provides:
"If a State Party has evidence of an unexpected or unusual public health event in its territory,
irrespective of origin or source, which may constitute a public health emergency of international concern, it shall provide WHO with all relevant public health information. In
'
such a case, the provisions of Article 6 [on notification] shall apply in full. 217
How Article 7's obligation to notify unexpected or unusual public health events that may
constitute a public health emergency of international concern differs from the notification
duties in Article 6 (as implemented by the decision instrument in Annex 2) is not clear.
After all, the decision instrument specifically asks whether the event being assessed is
unusual or unexpected in nature. 2 ' 8 The use of the phrase "irrespective of origin or

216 See January 2004 IHR Draft, above n.159, Art.41; September 2004 IHR Draft, above n.159, Art.45; and
Chair's January 2005 IHR Draft, above n.159, Art.45.
217 IHR 2005, above n.1, Art.7.
218 Ibid., Annex 2. In comments on the Chair's January 2005 IHR Draft, a group of 10 countries in South America
argued that, with respect to a suspected intentional release, "[ilf such an event were to pose an international
public health risk, it would already be provided for under the IHR. Therefore, we propose the deletion of
this Article [451 as we cannot see any specific justification for its inclusion". Montevideo Document: Considerations and Points of Consensus between Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Columbia, Ecuador, Paraguay, Peru,
Uruguay and Venezuela with Regard to Document A/IHR/IGWG/2/2 of 24 January 2005.
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source" in Article 7 merely replicates the use of the same phrase in the new IHR's definition
219
of "disease".
However awkward, Article 7, combined with the broad scope of the new IHR's
disease application, means that the new IHR apply to suspected intentional releases of
WMD agents. Thus, the United States' understanding, issued the day the new IHR
were adopted, that the revised Regulations apply to all "health threats-chemical, biological and radiological-and all causes and modes of events-regardless whether they are
naturally occurring, accidental, or deliberate" 2 20 accurately states the substance of the new
IHR.
This situation connects, then, to concerns expressed during the IHR revision process
that WHO should not be involved in the highly sensitive national and international politics
on WMD. The IHR revision process had to walk the fine line between creating a framework
that would allow robust public health responses to real public health risks, regardless of
origin or source, but not entangle WHO in the dangerous politics of WMD arms
control. The new IHR achieved this delicate task by restricting WHO to engaging only in
public health tasks raised by suspected intentional releases of WMD agents. In other
words, the new IHR do not put WHO in the position of having to determine whether a
State Party has violated its obligations under arms control treaties or UN Security
Council Resolutions on WMD.
These limits are apparent in the purpose of the new IHR, which state that the revised
Regulations concern preventing, protecting against, controlling and responding to the international spread of disease in ways commensurate with and restricted to, public health
risks.221 Obligations to provide information under Article 7 are no different from the
duties contained in Article 6 to notify WHO of any event that may constitute a public
health emergency of international concern. The new IHR also define "health measure" to
222
exclude law enforcement or security measures.
The new IHR do not prevent and could not have prevented 223 the UN Security Council
from involving itself or WHO more deeply in the international security implications of a
suspected deliberate release of a WMD weapon. The possibility that the Security Council
could involve itself and WHO in situations involving suspected intentional releases or
even naturally occurring disease events remains, thus, real. Certainly, any suspected release
of a WMD agent would fall within the Security Council's mandate to maintain international

219 IHR 2005, above n.1, Art. Il..
220 Statement for the Record by the United States of America Concerning the World Health Organization's Revised
International Health Regulations, 23 May 2005.
221 IHR 2005, above n.], Art.2.
222 Ibid., Art. l.1.
223 The new IHR could not have restricted the Security Council's authority to address threats to international peace
and security granted under the UN Charter because such a restriction would have effectively amended the
Charter and created potential conflict between the new IHR and the Charter. The Charter itself provides
that any conflict between the Charter and any other international agreement shall be resolved in favour of
the Charter. UN Charter, Art.103.
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peace and security. 224 Should the Security Council move in this direction, the States Parties
to the new IHR must comply with any Security Council decisions under both the UN
Charter 225 and the new IHR, which provide that the "implementation of these Regulations
shall be guided by the Charter of the United Nations ...[] .
IV.B.iv. The scope of obligations in the new IHR
A fourth aspect of the scope theme involves how the new IHR significantly increase the scope
of the obligations States Parties must undertake. The revised Regulations' duties are more
demanding than anything that appeared in the classical regime. This section examines key
areas in which the scope of the IHR's obligations for States Parties have increased.
The relationshipof the scope of disease application to the new IHR's obligations. Expanding
the scope of the IHR's disease application increases, by definition, the scope of each State
Party's obligations from what existed in the old IHR. The task of balancing public health
protections and trade concerns becomes, for example, more complex when both communicable and non-communicable disease risks are in play. The new IHR's rules on what public
health measures are permissible to apply to travellers, goods, conveyances and containers
apply to public health risks of whatever source or origin, and not just a small number of
infectious diseases.
Balancingpublic health and human rights.Another area in which the new IHR expand the
scope of the IHR's obligations involves the revised Regulations' incorporation of human
rights principles. The new IHR require that the Regulations shall be implemented "with
227
full respect for the dignity, human rights and fundamental freedoms of persons".
Neither the old IHR nor any manifestation of the classical regime embedded in their
texts contains obligations based on international human rights norms. Numerous provisions
in the new IHR support the general principle of implementing the revised Regulations in
ways that respect dignity, human rights and fundamental freedoms (see Table 2). The
human rights obligations in the new IHR mean that the objective of minimum interference
with international traffic includes protecting not only trade flows, but also human rights.
Interestingly, WHO's proposals for incorporating human rights found in the January
2004 IHR Draft contained stricter obligations on States Parties with respect to protecting
the rights of individuals than existing international human rights law. The January 2004

224 Controversy exists, however, with respect to whether a naturally occurring disease event would constitute a threat
to international peace and security that the Security Council could address. China has argued, for example, that
"iclurrently there are no universally recognized standards to define whether contagious diseases
pose a threat to
international peace and security. Given that the Security Council's main function is to deal with issues that pose
grave threats to international peace and security, it is unadvisable for it to repeat the work of other agencies [e.g.
WHO]". Position Paper of the People's Republic of China on UN Reform, World News Connection, 9 June
2005. This Chinese argument is weak because, under the UN Charter, the Security Council alone has competence to determine what constitutes a threat to international peace and security. This statement suggests,
however, that China may veto Security Council action on naturally occurring infectious diseases.
225 UN Charter, Art.25.
226 IHR 2005, above n.1,Art.3.2.
227 Ibid., Art.3.1.
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Table 2: Provisions in the new IHR relevant to the protection of human rights

Article

Subject matter

3.1

The new IHR shall be implemented with full respect for the dignity, human rights
and fundamental freedoms of persons

23.2

On the basis of evidence of a public health risk, States Parties may apply additional
health measures to travellers, including the least intrusive and invasive medical
examination that would achieve the public health objective of preventing the
international spread of disease

23.3

No medical examination, vaccination, prophylaxis or health measures shall
be carried out on travellers without their prior express informed consent,
except in situations in which compulsory measures are warranted

23.4

Travellers to be vaccinated or offered prophylaxis shall be informed of any risk
associated with vaccination or non-vaccination and with the use or non-use of
prophylaxis

23.5

Any medical examination, medical procedure, vaccination or other prophylaxis
which involves a risk of disease transmission shall be performed or administered
only in accordance with established national or international safety guidelines and
standards

31.1

Invasive medical examination, vaccination or other prophylaxis shall not be required
of any traveller except in circumstances specified in the new IHR

31.2

States Parties may implement compulsory health measures against travellers if there
is evidence of an imminent public health risk; any compulsory medical examination shall be the least invasive and intrusive examination that would achieve the
public health objective

32

In implementing health measures, States Parties shall treat travellers with respect for
their dignity, human rights and fundamental freedoms and minimize any discomfort or distress associated with such measures, including by treating all travellers with courtesy and respect; taking into consideration the gender, sociocultural, ethnic or religious concerns of travellers; and providing for adequate
food and water, accommodation and clothing, baggage protection, medical
treatment, means of communication and other appropriate assistaice to travellers
who are quarantined, isolated or subject to medical examinations or other procedures for public health purposes
Health measures undertaken under the new IHR shall be initiated and completed
without delay and applied in a transparent and non-discriminatory manner

42
43.2

Additional health measures that provide the same or greater levels of health
protection than WHO recommendations or that are otherwise prohibited by
the new IHR shall not be more invasive or intrusive to persons than
reasonably available alternatives that would achieve the appropriate level
of health protection

45.1

States Parties must protect the confidentiality of personally identifiable information
received or collected under the new IHR

45.2

In disclosing and processing personal data for purposes of assessing and managing a
public health risks, States Parties and WHO must such data is processed fairly and
lawfully, relevant to the public health purpose, accurate and kept up to date and
kept no longer than necessary

45.3

WHO must provide an individual who requests his or her personal data with access
to it and to correct such data when necessary
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IHR Draft prohibited States Parties from carrying out any invasive medical examination,
vaccination or prophylaxis on travellers under the revised IHR without the travellers'
229
interprior informed consent.228 If certain procedures and protections are followed,
national human rights law allows compulsory examination, vaccination or prophylaxis
without the informed consent of an individual to be undertaken in order to protect
public health.23 °
Recognizing that the January 2004 IHR Draft constrained sovereignty even more than
existing international human rights law, WHO modified the revised IHR draft by allowing
a State Party to utilize compulsory examination, vaccination or prophylaxis against a person
not giving his or her consent when such compulsory measure is necessary to control an
imminent public health threat. 23 1 The new IHR adopt this approach and allow States
Parties to use compulsory measures where they have evidence of an imminent public
health risk.232 The revised Regulation's provisions on compulsory measures raise,
however, two concerns from a human rights perspective. First, the new IHR only require
States Parties to apply the least intrusive and invasive measure in connection with medical
examinations but not to vaccination, prophylaxis, isolation or quarantine. 233 Secondly, the
revised Regulations do not contain requirements that States Parties accord those subject to
compulsory measures due process protections, such as the right to challenge such measures
in court.
Notification obligations. The new IHR's requirement that States Parties notify WHO of
any event that may constitute a public health emergency of international concern in its
territory2 34 is significantly broader than the old IHR's duty to report cases of only three
specific infectious diseases. The broad scope of the notification requirement is consistent
with WHO's desire to build a comprehensive framework for addressing the international
spread of disease. Expanding the notification obligation around the concept of a "public
health emergency of international concern" required, however, the construction of an
approach radically different from one based on identified infectious diseases and that
guides States Parties on how to determine whether a disease event may constitute a public
health emergency of international concern.
The new IHR require States Parties to use a "decision instrument" to assess whether a
disease event might be a public health emergency of international concern and thus
228 January 2004 IHR Draft, above n.159, Art.36.2.
229 See Siracusa Principles on the Limitation and Derogation of Provisions in the International Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights, UN Doc. E/CN.4/1985/4 (1985) (hereinafter Siracusa Principles).
230 IHR Conflicts Analysis, above n.210, 67-8 ("International law allows states to require medical examination,
vaccination, or other prophylaxis as a condition of admission for travelers as long asthere is compliance with
international human rights law. ... International human rights law recognizes the legitimacy of requiring compulsory medical examination, vaccination, or other prophylaxis in exceptional circumstances").
231 September 2004 IHR Draft, above n.159, Art.27.4. See also Chair's January 2005 IHR Draft, above n.159,
Art.27.2.
232 IHR 2005, above n.1, Art.31.2.
233 Ibid., Arts 23.2 and 31.2.
234 Ibid., Art.6.1.
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' As per WHO case definitions; b the disease list shall be used only for purposes of these Regulations.
Figure 2. The new IHR's "decision instrument".
notifiable to WHO under the new IHR (see Figure 2).235 The decision instrument contains
three pathways for States Parties to determine whether they must notify a disease event to
WHO. First, if the disease event involves a case of smallpox, poliomyelitis due to wildtype polio virus, human influenza caused by a new virus subtype, or SARS, it shall be notified

235 Ibid., Art.6.1, Annex 2.
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to WHO. 236 The new IHR essentially deem any case of these diseases to be an event that may
constitute a public health emergency of international concern. This pathway is diseasespecific like the notification approach in the old IHR, but the infectious diseases on the
disease-specific list do not include cholera, plague or yellow fever.
Secondly, if the disease event involves cholera, pneumonic plague, yellow fever, viral haemorrhagic fevers (Ebola, Lassa, Marburg), West Nile fever or other diseases that are of special
national or regional concern (e.g. dengue fever, Rift Valley fever and meningococcal disease),
then States Parties must always use the decision instrument to assess whether the event may
constitute a public health emergency of international concern. The diseases under this
second pathway are singled out because "they have demonstrated the ability to cause
serious public health impact and to spread rapidly internationally". 237 Application of the
decision instrument does not necessarily mean that any particular case of these diseases
must be reported because the obligation to report will depend on the outcome of the decision
238
instrument's utilization.
The third pathway requires that States Parties apply the decision instrument to any disease
event not falling under the other two pathways. 239 This pathway is particularly important
because it requires application of the decision instrument to disease events of unknown
causes or sources. Thus, the new IHR avoid the rigidity that hampered the old IHR's
disease-specific approach to notification.
Disease events that fall within the second and third pathways have to be assessed by States
Parties' answering four questions: (1) Is the public health impact of the event serious? (2) Is
the event unusual or unexpected? (3) Is there a significant risk of international spread? and
(4) Is there a significant risk of international travel or trade restrictions? 240 If a State Party
answers "yes" to any two of these questions, the event is deemed one that may constitute
a public health emergency of international concern and must be reported to WHO under
the new IHR. The revised Regulations provide non-binding examples for the application
241
of the decision instrument's four questions to assist States Parties.
From the January 2004 IHR Draft through the new IHR, the decision instrument was the
central concept in crafting a new notification regime for the revised IHR. The regime and the
decision instrument evolved, however, during the negotiations to reflect different perspectives
of the negotiating States. The January 2004 IHR Draft contained the decision instrument,

236 Ibid., Annex 2.
237 Ibid.
238 One can sense the difference in the approach of the new IHR from the old IHR in their respective handling of
cholera, plague and yellow fever. The old IHR required States Parties to report cases of cholera, plague or yellow
fever without reference to whether such cases could involve international spread. IHR 1969, above n.16, Art.3.
The new IHR's approach requires States Parties to assess any case of cholera, plague or yellow fever to determine
whether such case is of international concern. IHR 2005, above n.1, Annex 2.
239 IHR 2005, above n.1, Annex 2.
240 Ibid.
241 Ibid.
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with its four questions, but did not have any disease-specific aspects. 242 WHO added these
aspects in the September 2004 IHR Draft.243 The automatically notifiable diseases were
smallpox, poliomyelitis and SARS.244 According to WHO, adding a list of notifiable diseases to supplement the decision instrument represented a compromise to accommodate
the views of WHO Member States strongly in favour of adding a fixed list of diseases for
mandatory notification and the views of Member States that did not want a disease-specific
24 5

list.

The September 2004 IHR Draft also required States Parties to utilize the decision instrument to assess all events involving specific infectious diseases identified in a list. 246 The
Chair's January 2005 IHR Draft did not contain any changes to the decision instrument
because of work on the instrument by an ad hoc expert group. 247 The report of the ad
hoc group, issued in February 2005, contained the version of the decision instrument eventually adopted as part of the new IHR.' 48
Obligations on core surveillance and response capacities.The new IHR expand the scope of
obligations in another seminal way. The revised Regulations require States Parties to develop,
strengthen and maintain core capacities to (1) detect, assess, notify and report disease events;
and (2) respond promptly and effectively to public health risks and public health emergencies of international concern. 249 These core surveillance and response capacities are spelled
out in Annex 1 of the new IHR. These broad-based obligations to establish and sustain
surveillance and response capabilities across the range of public health risks covered by the
new IHR go beyond the limited duties the old IHR imposed on States Parties to maintain
certain public health capabilities at points of disease entry. 250 The burdens that these
242 January 2004 IHR Draft, above n.159, Annex 2.
243 September 2004 IHR Draft, above n.159, Annex 2.
244 Ibid. ("A single diagnosed case of any of the following diseases is of international concern and shall therefore be
notified to WHO: *Smallpox *Poliomyelitis (occurring in an area following eradication) *Coronavirusassociated severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS)").
245 Review and Approval of Proposed IHR Amendments, above n.175, para.7 ("Member States expressed different
views regarding lists of diseases, ranging from a strong desire to retain a fixed list of diseases for mandatory international notification to no wanting any such list in the text."); Summary of Regional Consultations, above
n.172, para.7 ("Many Member States advocate adding a list of specific diseases, but opinions differ as to
whether the list should be made binding or only indicative ...
Other Member States are satisfied with the
decision instrument as proposed, with minor adjustments").
246 September 2004 IHR Draft, above n. 159, Annex 2, Part B. The infectious diseases listed are cholera, CrimeanCongo haemorrhagic fever, Ebola haemorrhagic fever, inhalational anthrax, pneumonic plague, Nipah virus
encephalitis, Lassa fever, Marburg haemorrhagic fever and yellow fever. These nine infectious diseases "have
demonstrated the ability to cause serious public health impact and have the potential to spread rapidly
internationally".
247 World Health Organization, Review and Approval of Proposed Amendments to the International Health Regulations: Proposal by the Chair, Corrigendum, A/IHR/IGWG/2/2, Corr. 1, 24 January 2005.
248 World Health Organization, Decision Instrument for the Assessment and Notification of Events that May Constitute a Public Health Emergency of International Concern: Report of the Ad Hoc Expert Group on Annex 2,
A/IHR/IGWG/2/INF.DOC./4, 22 February 2005.
249 IHR 2005, above n.1, Arts 5.1 and 13.1.
250 The new IHR also contain point-of-entry obligations and thus continue that aspect of the classical regime. IHR
2005, above n.1, Arts 19-22.

Fidler, From InternationalSanitary Conventions to Global Health Security 373

core-capacity obligations would create for States Parties was a concern raised in the negotiations.25 ' WHO responded to these concerns by including a five-year grace period
during which States Parties had to develop the surveillance and response capacities indicated
in the revised IHR. 252 The new IHR also allow States to get a two-year extension on fulfilment of their core capacity obligations by submitting to the Director-General a justified need
and implementation plan. 253 In exceptional circumstances, a State Party can apply to the
Director-General for a further extension not to exceed two years and the Director-General
has the authority to grant or deny such a request. 254 WHO also included language in the
negotiating texts and the new IHR that highlighted "the need for increased co-operation
between WHO and States and among all States Parties to assess existing capacities and
255
mobilize financial and technical resources to strengthen them".
The expanded scope of the obligations concerning core public health capacities remained
consistent from the January 2004 IHR Draft to the new IHR. This consistency reflects the
depth of WHO's and its Member States' concerns that weak national public health capabilities seriously undermine efforts to provide global health security. The new IHR's corecapacity obligations bear some resemblance to duties created by treaties containing the
international human right to health. The International Covenant on Economic, Social
and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) includes the right to health, and respecting this right requires
States Parties to take steps to achieve identified health objectives, including the prevention
and control of endemic and epidemic diseases. 256 Achieving such objectives requires
certain public health surveillance and response capabilities. The ICESCR's right to health
is, however, to be progressively realized in accordance with a State Party's available
resources. 257 In other words, the obligation to respect the right to health is relative to the
availability of economic resources in a State Party.
The surveillance and response capacity obligations in the new IHR are more demanding
than those found in the ICESCR's right to health because, after the five-year grace period
and any extensions, the States Parties are required to have the surveillance and response
capacities identified in Annex 1 of the new IHR. The new IHR do not contain a principle
of progressive realization linked to the availability of economic resources. The revised Regulations impose obligations on States Parties to develop and maintain core public health
capacities. Fulfilment of these obligations would benefit the pursuit of global health security
and the right to health.

251 Review and Approval of Proposed IHR Amendments, above n.175, para.15.
252 IHR 2005, above n.1, Arts 5.1 and 13.1 See also September 2004 IHR Draft, above n.159, Arts 4.1 and 11.1
(five-year grace period); Chair's January 2005 IHR Draft, above n.159, Arts 4.1 and 11.1 (length of grace
period left blank).
253 IHR 2005, above n.1, Arts 5.2 and 13.2.
254 Ibid.
255 Review and Approval of Proposed IHR Amendments, above n.175, para.15. See September 2004 IHR Draft,
above n.159, Art.l 1.4; Chair's January 2005 IHR Draft, above n. 159, Art. 1.5; IHR 2005, above n. 1, Art.l 1.5.
256 ICESCR, above n.65, Art.12.
257 Ibid., Art.2.1.
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The new IHR leave unanswered, however, how many States Parties with weak or nonexistent public health systems will comply with their core-capacity obligations. The
revised Regulations contain no obligations on States Parties to provide financial or technical
resources to help developing and least-developed countries develop and maintain the requirements in Annex 1. The new IHR oblige States Parties to undertake to collaborate with each
other, to the extent possible, in (1) providing or facilitating technical co-operation and logistical support, particularly in the development, strengthening and maintenance of the public
health capacities required by the Regulations; and (2) the mobilization of financial resources
to facilitate implementation of the new IHR.2 5 8 As explored more below in Part V, such a
weak obligation on financial and technical assistance does not address the future implementation problems the core-capacity requirements will face.

IV.B.v. The scope of participation in the new IHR
Including non-State actors in the new IHR. The fifth category in the scope expansion theme
involves the scope of participation in the new IHR. As indicated earlier, all versions of the
classical regime, including the old IHR, were State-centric in nature. State-centrism meant
that the only official and legitimate participants in the regime were States and intergovernmental organizations-and, between these, States dominated and controlled the manner in
which the regime operated. The limited scope of participation was most clear in connection
with surveillance information about outbreaks because the old IHR restricted WHO to
handling and disseminating only information provided by governments of the Member
States affected by outbreaks. WHO could, and did, receive surveillance information from
other governments and non-governmental sources but the old IHR did not permit WHO
to act on such information.
As described earlier, a key idea pursued during the IHR revision process was allowing
WHO to collect and use surveillance information received from non-governmental
sources. The benefits of WHO having access to and the ability to use non-governmental
sources of disease information became clear during the SARS outbreak because WHO effectively used such sources of information in effectively managing the global resource to the outbreak. The new IHR build this strategy into the revised Regulations. First, WHO "may take
into account reports from sources other than notifications or consultations" from or with
States Parties. 259 Secondly, WHO has to try to obtain verification of such information
from the States Parties concerned before taking action and States Parties must participate
2 60
in the verification effort.
Expanding WHO's access to surveillance information increases the scope of participation
in the global health security strategy. The new IHR incorporate non-governmental sources of
information into the surveillance process, thus making non-State actors formally part of the
governance mechanism of the revised Regulations. Increasing the scope of participation in
258 IHR 2005, above n.1, Art.44.1(b) -(c).
259 Ibid., Art.9.1.
260 Ibid., Arts 9.1 and 10.1-10.2.
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this way highlights how the process of achieving global health security differs from the Statecentric approach of international health security found in the classical regime. WHO's
ability to gather and use non-governmental sources of information and the obligation on
States Parties to respond to requests for verification of such information received from
WHO mean that States no longer dominate or control the process of epidemiological
surveillance.
One provision in the new IHR might, however, weaken the participation of individual
non-States actors in the global surveillance system supported by the new IHR. The
revised Regulations require WHO to share non-governmental information with States
Parties "and only where it is duly justified may WHO maintain the confidentiality of the
source". 26 ' This rule raises the possibility that WHO identification of individuals who
provide epidemiological information could be targeted by authoritarian or repressive
regimes for retribution. The new IHR contain no criteria to guide WHO in making the
determination that protecting the confidentiality of an individual source is justified. Any
decision to deny providing a State Party with the identity of a source of information will
probably involve political controversy and consequences for WHO.
Wideningpublic health participation.The new IHR also increase the scope of participation
in the new rules within WHO and each Member State. The shift from infectious diseases
only to public health emergencies of international concern arising from public health
risks of whatever source or origin increases the number and kinds of public health personnel
and assets potentially affected by the revised Regulations. This participatory effect can be
illustrated through WHO's efforts to develop a global surveillance capability for chemical
threats to compliment what GOARN does in the infectious disease area. 262 The new IHR
can be expected to have the same broadening effect on public health participation within
WHO Member States also, because the increase in the scope of the disease application implicates a broader range of national public health capabilities.
Allowing Taiwan to participatein the new IHR. A final aspect of the new IHR increasing
the scope of participation concerns the problem between Taiwan and China. As mentioned
earlier, Taiwan's desire to participate formally in the revised IHR proved controversial
during the negotiations. Taiwan argued that its formal participation would support the
need for the revised IHR to have universal geographical application. China refused to
allow Taiwan to participate formally based on its claims that it has sovereignty over
Taiwan. Such sovereignty means that Taiwan's circumstances do not undermine universal
geographical application of the revised IHR because the Regulations apply to all of
China, including Taiwan.
The new IHR did not resolve this controversy. The revised Regulations provide that "[t] he
implementation of these Regulations shall be guided by the goal of their universal application for the protection of all people of the world from the international spread of

261 Ibid., Art.9.1.
262 See World Health Organization, ChemiNet: A Global Public Health Chemical Incident Alert, Surveillance and
Response Network, 78 Weekly Epidemiological Record (2003), 337.
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disease". 263 Taiwan argues that this rule allows it to interact directly with WHO without
China's involvement. 264 China insists that this provision does not undermine its sovereignty
over Taiwan and that WHO must obtain China's consent before engaging in activities with
Taiwan. 265 China strengthened its position by signing with WHO a memorandum in May
2005 under which WHO must seek China's consent before having direct contact with
Taiwan. 266 Taiwan rejects the legitimacy of this memorandum because it was negotiated
without Taiwanese participation. 267 Taiwan's and China's political standoff continues,
unmitigated by the new IHR.

IV.B.vi. The scope of WHO's authority and responsibility
The sixth category in the scope expansion theme involves the manner in which the new IHR
significantly increase the scope of WHO's authority and responsibility. Certainly, WHO had
authority and responsibilities under the old IHR; but the new IHR contain authority and
responsibilities for WHO never before created for an international health organization in
the history of the classical regime. The expanded scope of WHO authority and responsibility
can be seen in a number of features of the new IHR.
Surveillance. Allowing WHO to collect and act upon sources of information provided by
non-State actors expands WHO's authority and responsibilities in three ways. First, as analysed above, the new IHR grant WHO the power to use non-governmental sources of information, something not allowed by the old IHR. This authority changes the surveillance
dynamic between WHO and Member States in ways that favour global health security
over national sovereignty. Secondly, permitting WHO to collect surveillance data from
non-governmental sources imposes duties on WHO to engage in such collection efficiently
and effectively. In creating and refining GOARN, WHO has moved to shoulder this responsibility, but the responsibility has taken on a governance importance of great magnitude.
Thirdly, in allowing WHO to act on non-governmental sources of surveillance information,
the new IHR create responsibilities for WHO to verify such information to ensure that its
actions are based on accurate information. Although verification of data about public
health risks is not novel for WHO, the new IHR significantly heighten the burden WHO
bears for the validity of information that forms the basis for actions it takes. Part of this

263 IHR 2005, above n.1,Art.3.3.
264 Michael Chen, Taiwan Effort to Join WHO is Health Imperative, Financial Times, 21 May 2005, 12 (Taiwanese official arguing that, under the principle of universality in the proposed IHR, "Taiwan and the WHO
ought to be allowed to co-operate directly, especially in the event of a public health emergency on the
island."); Taiwan-China Ties Improving, Officials Say, China Post, 26 May 2005 (reporting Taiwanese officials
as claiming the new IHR's principle of universality as "providing a basis for Taiwan to make contact with the
WHO directly without China's interference").
265 Taiwan's WHO Bid Has No Legal Basis, China Daily, 31 May 2005 (reporting Chinese government's position
that the principle of universal application does not support Taiwan's claims of having direct access to WHO).
266 Ibid. (describing the memorandum between China and WHO).
267 China's Professed Care for Taiwan a Shameless Lie: MAC, China Post, 20 May 2005 (Chairman of Taiwan's
Mainland Affairs Council (MAC) criticizing the WHO-China memorandum on Taiwan).
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heightened burden also comes from WHO's authority to take action on information it
receives from sources other than governments.
Confidentialityof information. Under the new IHR, WHO has obligations to keep certain
kinds of information confidential, except in specified circumstances. First, WHO has to
maintain the confidentiality of information it receives from States Parties, unless WHO
(1) declares that an event is a public health emergency of international concern; (2) confirms
information evidencing the international spread of the infection or contamination; (3) has
evidence that (a) control measures against international spread are unlikely to succeed, or
(b) the State Party in question lacks the capacity to carry out the measures necessary to
prevent further disease spread; or (4) determines that only immediate application of
control measures will effectively address the infection or contamination. 268 When justified
by the magnitude of a public health risk, WHO may also share information it receives
with other States Parties if a State Party in whose territory the risk exists does not agree to
collaborate with WHO. 269 These provisions more appropriately balance the States Parties'
desire for confidentiality of disease-related information with the public health need for dissemination of such information than the rules contained in the old IHR.
Secondly, WHO has to protect the confidentiality of personally identifying information
in assessing and managing a public health risk and has to provide an individual with his or
her personal data held by WHO and correct any inaccuracies in such data.270 These provisions on confidentiality of personally identifiable information never appeared in the classical regime and reflect the new IHR's incorporation of human rights principles and
protections.
Response interventions. The new IHR grant WHO the authority to declare the existence
of public health emergencies of international concern 27 1 and issue non-binding temporary
recommendations to States Parties concerning how they should respond to such emergencies. 272 The new IHR also grant WHO authority to issue non-binding standing
recommendations concerning appropriate health measures for routine and periodic application against on-going, specific public health risks to prevent or reduce the international
273
spread of disease and minimize interference with international traffic.

268 IHR 2005, above n.l, Art.11.2.
269 Ibid., Art.10.4.
270 Ibid., Arts 45.2-45.3.
271 Ibid., Art.12. This new power was a consistent element of the main negotiating texts. January 2004 IHR Draft,
above n.159, Art.9; September 2004 IHR Draft, above n.159, Art.10; Chair's January 2005 IHR Draft, above
n.159, Art.10.

272 IHR 2005, above n.1, Art.15. The provisions on temporary recommendations in the main negotiating texts can
be found in January 2004 IHR Draft, above n. 159, Art. 11; September 2004 [HR Draft, above n. 159, Art. 13;
Chair's January 2005 IHR Draft, above n.159, Art.13.
273 [HR 2005, above n.i, Arts 1.1 (definition of standing recommendation) and 16. Although the old IHR do not
grant such authority, the power to issue standing recommendations does not deviate far from WHO's longstanding practices of providing recommendations to its Member States on appropriate health policies and
practices.
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The declaration and temporary recommendation authorities significantly depart from WHO
powers under the old IHR. Under the new IHR, States Parties are required to notify WHO of
events that may constitute public health emergencies of international concern, 274 but the power
to declare that an event actually constitutes such an emergency rests with the WHO DirectorGeneral.275 The determination that a public health emergency of international concern exists
triggers the Director-General's obligation to issue temporary recommendations to States
276
Parties on the appropriate responses and health measures to implement.
WHO has to consult with affected States Parties in exercising its powers to declare an event
as a public health emergency of international concern 277 and to issue temporary recommendations, 278 but it can exercise the declaration and temporary recommendation authorities
without obtaining the permission of States Parties potentially harmed by such actions.
Under the old IHR, the refusal of a State Party to provide information or to co-operate
with WHO essentially blocked WHO from taking effective actions to address the public
health threat. The new IHR eliminate the ability of a State Party to veto WHO action on
public health emergencies of international concern.
New institutional bodies and procedures. WHO's heightened authority and responsibilities under the new IHR create the need for the creation of new institutional bodies and procedures within WHO. The new IHR establish an Emergency Committee to advise the
Director-General on whether an event constitutes a public health emergency of international
concern and on the issuance of temporary recommendations.2 79 The functioning of the Emergency Committee is subject to procedural and substantive requirements established in the
revised Regulations. 280 WHO must also establish IHR Contact Points, which have to be accessible at all times to States Parties and have to send urgent communications concerning the
implementation of the new IHR to States Parties. 2 8i Adhering to these requirements in connection with exercising authority and responsibility in situations of urgency poses institutional
challenges WHO did not have to tackle under the old HR.
The new IHR also impose other responsibilities on WHO, including offering to collaborate with States Parties in assessing disease events, 28 2 providing technical assistance to and
collaborating with States Parties on various aspects of surveillance and response, 283 disseminating public health information to States Parties, 284 co-operating with other international

274 IHR 2005, above n.1, Art.6.
275 Ibid., Art.12.1.
276 Ibid., Art. 15.1.
277 Ibid., Art. 12.2.
278 Ibid., Art.49.4.
279 Ibid., Art.48. For standing recommendations, the Director-General must seek the views of a Review Committee.
Ibid., Arts 50 (establishing the Review Committee) and 53 (procedures for standing recommendations).
280 Ibid., Art.49.
281 Ibid., Art.4.3.
282 Ibid., Art.10.3.
283 Ibid., Arts 5.3, 13.3, 13.4 and 13.6.
284 Ibid., Art.11.2 and 11.4.
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286
These responorganizations and bodies, 285 and assisting States Parties in settling disputes.
sibilities further underscore how critical and expansive WHO's role is to the governance envisioned in the new IHR and how important ensuring that WHO is adequately staffed and
resourced to shoulder its increased authorities and responsibilities will be for the success
of the global health security strategy.

IV.C. Sovereignty and the new IHR
The second major theme I use to explore the key substantive changes found in the new IHR
concerns the impact of the revised Regulations on the sovereignty of States Parties. How the
287
Specifically,
revised IHR would affect sovereignty featured in the IHR negotiations.
WHO Member States raised sovereignty concerns with respect to provisions in negotiating
texts that they thought might restrict their abilities to take actions to protect public health in
their territories. The new IHR express the balancing task being undertaken with respect to
sovereignty when they provide that "States ... have the sovereign right to legislate and to
implement legislation in pursuance of their health policies. In doing so they should
288
uphold the purpose of these Regulations".

IV.C.i. The scope and sovereignty themes
Before looking at specific areas in which sovereignty was an issue, a word is in order concerning the relationship between the expanded scope of the new IHR and the issue of sovereignty.
The expansion of the scopes of the IHR's disease application, participation in the governance
regime, obligations on States Parties and WHO's authorities and responsibilities has a significant impact on how States Parties to the new IHR will exercise their sovereignty.
These increased scopes govern more aspects of sovereignty and demand more from sovereign
States than anything ever attempted with the classical regime. The new IHR reflect a governance context in which the exercise of sovereignty by States in connection with public health is
changed forever.
Given this situation and the normal concerns States have about their sovereignty, the frequent appearance of sovereignty concerns during the IHR revision process is hardly surprising. These concerns should, however, be kept in perspective. All major proposals for
expanding the IHR's scope made in the January 2004 IHR Draft appear in the new IHR.
This remarkable situation indicates that many WHO Member States, for the most part,
appear to understand the world envisioned by the classical regime no longer exists, creating
the need for radically re-orienting sovereignty to the world reflected in the new IHR.
The major sovereignty concerns expressed by WHO Member States during the IHR revision negotiations arose with respect to provisions that they perceived might unnecessarily
285 Ibid., Arts 14, 17(f) and 57.1
286 Ibid., Arts 56.2 and 56.5.
287 See Summary Report of Regional Consultations, above n.172, para.8 (noting sovereignty concerns raised by
WHO Member States); Review and Approval of Proposed IHR Amendments, above n. 175, para. 10 (reporting
on WHO Member State concerns about WHO recommendations and sovereignty).
288 IHR 2005, above n.1, Art.3.4.
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reduce their freedom of action in responding to disease events affecting their territories. The
classical regime had to construct a balance between needed limitations on State sovereignty
and freedom of action for sovereign States. The old IHR failed to achieve the needed balance
because, for example, States Parties did not often follow the disciplines limiting the health
measures that could be applied to the trade and travel coming from States suffering outbreaks
of diseases subject to the Regulations. The old IHR were ineffective in curbing the freedom
of action of sovereign States. The new IHR face the same challenge, but the expanded scope
of the revised Regulations increases the magnitude of the task.
IV.C.ii. Sovereignty issues concerning WHO's surveillance authorities under
the new IHR
During the negotiations, States raised sovereignty concerns with respect to WHO's use of nongovernmental sources of information as part of global surveillance. WHO Member States
expressed some concerns that WHO would act on information received from non289
governmental sources without seeking to verify the information with the affected countries.
The January 2004 IHR Draft indicated that WHO "may validate these reports" in accordance
with verification procedures contained in the draft. 2 90 WHO responded to these Member State
concerns by re-drafting the relevant provision to require that WHO attempt to obtain verification of reports received from non-governmental sources before taking any action on such
reports,291 which is the approach adopted in the new IHR.292
This outcome retains WHO's ability to use surveillance information gathered from nongovernmental sources but increases the transparency of this process for States Parties that
might be the subject of reports from non-State actors. This situation produces a dynamic
under which States Parties have not only a duty293 but also an incentive to collaborate effectively with WHO in verifying the information and addressing the public health threat.
WHO Member States also identified potential sovereignty problems with two provisions
in the January 2004 IHR Draft that appeared to require States Parties to allow WHO to
conduct on-the-spot studies inside their territories to determine whether appropriate
control measures were being deployed in connection with a public health emergency of international concern. 294 WA-O reported that many Member States commented that these provisions "were neither acceptable nor feasible" 295 and that "WHO teams should enter
countries only with the consent of the affected Member State". 296 WHO revised these

289 Review and Approval of Proposed IHR Amendments, above n.175, 6 (noting comments from WHO Member
States on theneed to require WHO to try to obtain verification of non-governmental reports).
290 January 2004 IHR Draft, above n.159, Art.7.1.
291 September 2004 IHR Draft, above n. 159, Art.7.1. See also Chair's January 2005 IHR Draft, above n.159,
Art.7.1.
292 IHR 2005, above n.1,
Arts 9.1 and 10.1.
293 Ibid., Art. 10.2.
294 January 2004 IHR Draft, above n.159, Arts 8.3 and 10.3.
295 Review and Approval of Proposed IHR Amendments, above n.175, para. 14.
296 Summary of Regional Consultations, above n.172, para.8.
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provisions to make them clear that States Parties are not required to accept WHO's offer of
assistance "but, when declining an offer is judged [by WHO] to increase any risk that the
event will spread to other States, WHO may share information with States Parties about
the situation and the nature of the assistance that has been offered". 297 The new IHR incorporated this approach.298 States Parties retain their sovereignty to accept or reject offers of
help from WHO, but WHO has the ability to share information about the situation and
the refusal as part of its efforts to address the public health emergency of international
concern. States Parties have, thus, an incentive to co-operate because the entire world will
know when it is being recalcitrant with respect to a threat that might spread and adversely
affect other States.
IV.C.iii. Sovereignty issues involving WHO recommendations and
permissible national health measures
WHO Member States raised sovereignty concerns during the negotiations about WHO's
authority to issue recommendations. In each area in which WHO Member States raised
sovereignty issues relating to WHO recommendation powers, WHO modified the provisions
in question to accommodate Member State concerns, producing a balance between the need
for WHO to exercise its authority and the legitimate concerns Member States had about the
revised IHR impinging on their sovereignty.
Recommendations as non-binding limits on national health measures. The January 2004
IHR Draft provided that States Parties could not take health-related action unless the
revised IHR allowed the action or unless WHO had recommended such action under the
revised IHR. The January 2004 IHR Draft stated, for example, that "[u]nless recommended
by WHO or otherwiseprovided in these Regulations,medical examination, vaccination or other
prophylaxis shall not be required as a condition of admission of any traveller, except for travellers seeking temporary or permanent residence". 299 Such a provision made non-binding
recommendations behave like binding restrictions on the exercise of public health sovereignty. WHO noted that many Member States:
... felt that these references to WHO recommendations and their interplay with
binding prohibitions, created considerable confusion and could lead to undesirable
ambiguities in the legal status of measures introduced by States Parties which
exceeded or differed from those recommended by WHO. Concerns were also
expressed that limiting the authority of States Parties to introduce additional

297 Ibid. See September 2004 IHR Draft, above n.159, Arts 8.3 and 11.3; Chair's January 2005 IHR Draft, above
n.159, Art.8.4.
298 IHR 2005, above n.1, Arts 10.3-10.4.
299 January 2004 IHR Draft, above n.159, Art.23 (emphasis added). Similar language can be found in Arts 19.2,
21.1, 21.2, 24 and 27.2 of the January 2004 IHR Draft. Sometimes, the January 2004 IHR Draft permitted
actions "authorized by applicable international agreements" to avoid conflicts between the revised IHR and
other relevant treaties. Review and Approval of Proposed IHR Amendments, above n.175, para. 16 ("The
purpose of the reference [to "applicable international agreements"] is to enable State action in a manner permitted by those agreements even if not otherwise permitted by the Regulations").
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health-related measures through dependence on WHO's issuing recommendations
30 0
concerning a particular event unduly restricted the sovereignty of States Parties.
The new IHR reflect changes made to accommodate these sovereignty concerns. The revised
Regulations permit States Parties to implement health measures that differ from WHO recommendations as long as the measures achieve the same or greater level of health protection
than the WHO recommendations. 30' In addition, the new IHR allow States Parties to
implement health measures otherwise prohibited by specific provisions of the revised Regulations, provided such measures are otherwise consistent with the new IHR.30 2 Any of these
additional health measures must (1) not be more restrictive of international traffic and not
more invasive or intrusive to persons than reasonably available alternatives that would achieve
the appropriate level of health protection; 30 3 and (2) be based on scientific principles, available scientific
evidence of a risk to human health and any available guidance or advice from
304
W-HO.
If such additional health measures significantly interfere with international traffic, the
State Party shall provide WHO with the public health rationale and scientific information
supporting the measures. 30 5 Although the new IHR allow States Parties to implement
health measures that go beyond what WHO has recommended and that may otherwise be
prohibited by the revised Regulations, the disciplines applied to this ability mean that the
new IHR do not provide sovereignty with a free pass.
The approach in the new IHR resembles the structure and dynamics of obligations contained in the WTO's SPS Agreement and international human rights law. The SPS Agreement requires sanitary and phytosanitary measures that affect trade in goods to be based on
scientific principles and evidence and a risk assessment. 30 6 Similarly, international human
rights law requires that measures infringing on civil and political rights must be necessary
to achieve a compelling public interest, 30 7 which-in the context of disease controlincludes the mandate that the measure have a basis in science and public health. 30 8 The
new IHR,30 9 the309SPS Agreement 310 and international human rights law 31 ' require the
300 Review and Approval of Proposed IHR Amendments, above n.175, para.10.
301 IHR 2005, above n.1, Art.43.1(a).
302 Ibid., Art.43.1(b).
303 Ibid., Art.43.1.
304 Ibid., Art.43.2.
305 Ibid., Art.43.3.
306 SPS Agreement, above n.94, Arts 2.2 and 5.1.
307 See Siracusa Principles, above n.229, para.25 (stating that the health threat must be serious and that the measure
in question must be aimed at preventing illness or injury or providing care to the ill or injured).
308 The Siracusa Principles state that the IHR serve as a reference to guide public health measures (para.26) and the
IHR's approach is that restrictive measures be based on scientific and public health principles.
309 IHR 2005, above n.1, Art.43.3.
310 SPS Agreement, above n.94, Art.2.2.
311 As the Siracusa Principles indicate, international human rights law requires that governments infringing on the
enjoyment of human rights provide justification for such infringements. Siracusa Principles, above n.229,
para. 12.
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State Party imposing the measure in question to provide the scientific justification for the
measure.
The new IHR and the SPS Agreement also both require that the measure in question not
be more restrictive of international trade than reasonably available alternative measures,
which would achieve the appropriate level of health protection. 312 The same is true regarding
restrictions on human rights. The new IHR and international human rights law require that
measures infringing on the enjoyment of human rights be the least restrictive measure possible to achieve the level of health protection sought. 313 The parallels between the new IHR
and the disciplines in the SPS Agreement and international human rights law suggest that
WHO utilized the manner in which the SPS Agreement and international human rights
law, respectively, balance sovereignty, science and public health with respect to health
measures that may adversely affect international trade and travel.
Proceduresfor issuing WHO recommendations.The proposal to grant WHO recommendation powers also raised sovereignty issues for WHO Member States with respect to the
process through which WHO would issue the recommendations. The January 2004 IHR
Draft did not contain any criteria to guide WHO's decision to issue recommendations.
The lack of substantive criteria made the process of issuing recommendations look less
than transparent. WHO responded to these concerns by including in the September 2004
IHR Draft "the principles and criteria to be considered by the Director-General when
314
issuing, modifying or terminating recommendations".
The new IHR apply criteria to WHO's issuance of recommendations, including principles
similar to those found in Article 43 of revised Regulations, the SPS Agreement and international human rights law, namely that the Director-General must consider the views of
the directly concerned States Parties; scientific principles, scientific evidence and information; relevant international standards and instruments; activities undertaken by other relevant international organizations and bodies; and what health measures are least restrictive of
international traffic and trade and not more intrusive to persons than reasonably available
315
alternatives that would achieve the appropriate level of health protection.
In addition, WHO Member States complained that the process proposed in the January
2004 IHR Draft for WHO's issuance of temporary recommendations did not adequately
provide for the opportunity for States Parties potentially affected by such recommendations
to provide input to the Emergency Committee. 3 16 WHO accommodated these concerns by
granting States Parties potentially affected by temporary recommendations the right to

312 IHR 2005, above n.i, Art.43.1; SPS Agreement, above n.94, Art.5.6.
313 IHR 2005, above n.1, Art.43.1; Siracusa Principles, above n.229, para.10.
314 Review and Approval of Proposed IHR Amendments, above n.175, para. 11.
315 IHR 2005, above n.1, Art.17.
316 Review and Approval of Proposed IHR Amendments, above n. 175, para. I1 ("Concerns were also expressed that
the process to be followed by WHO in issuing, modifying or terminating temporary or standing recommendations was not sufficiently transparent and accountable and that the procedure foreseen in the January 2004
working paper did not allow States Parties that could be affected by those recommendations to participate adequately in the process").
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present their views to the Emergency Committee. 317 The new IHR include this right to
present information to the Emergency Committee with respect to the issuance of temporary
31 8
recommendations.
Additional measures against specialcategories ofpersons.As noted earlier, a major feature of
the international sanitary conventions and the ISR was the application of additional rules for
either regions (e.g. Middle East), events (e.g. annual pilgrimage to Mecca) or categories of
people (e.g. pilgrims, migrants or nomads). This feature of the classical regime was
reduced to one provision in the old IHR.3 19 The January 2004 IHR Draft contained basically the same provision as the old IHR and this provision stated that "[m]igrants, nomads,
seasonal workers or persons taking part in periodic mass congregations may be subjected to
additional health measures conforming with the laws and regulations of each State concerned
and with any agreement concluded between any such States". 320
The September 2004 IHR Draft eliminated this provision. WHO explained that the provision "was deleted in light of comments received and new articles in the draft revision, such
as Article 39, which provide the necessary flexibility required by Member States wanting to
tackle the issues previously dealt with in this provision". 321 Thus, the September 2004 IHR
Draft had one provision on additional measures-Article 39-that applies universally rather
than rules on specific categories of places, events or persons. Any such additional measures
must be based on scientific principles and evidence, a risk assessment and must not be more
restrictive of international traffic or human rights than reasonably available alternative
measures that would achieve the appropriate level of health protection sought. 32 2 These proposals would have brought to an end the tradition of having special rules for particular
regions, events or people in the international legal framework for disease control.
The Chair's January 2005 IHR Draft reintroduced the issue, however, through a rule
which provided that "[t]he provisions of this Article (391 may apply to implementation of
measures concerning travellers taking part in periodic mass congregations". 323 The new
IHR contain the same provision as part of Article 43.324 What is curious about the reintroduction of a rule specifically on mass congregations is that it does not require measures for
mass congregations to comply with the scientific, trade-related and human rights disciplines

317 September 2004 IHR Draft, above n.159, Art.49.3. See also Chair's January 2005 IHR Draft, above n.159,
Art.49.4.
318 IHR 2005, above n.1, Art.49.4.
319 IHR 1969, above n.16, Art.84.
320 January 2004 IHR Draft, above n.159, Art.37.1.
321 Review and Approval of Proposed IHR Amendments, above n.175, para. 11.
322 September 2004 IHR Draft, above n.159, Art.39.1.
323 Chair's January 2005 IHR Draft, above n.159, Art.39.8. Iraq and Saudi Arabia both proposed amendments to
Article 39 of the September 2004 IHR Draft during the November 2004 negotiations that would have specifically recognized the right of States Parties that receive large numbers of visitors to holy places to implement
additional health measures to deal with disease problems. World Health Organization, Review and Approval
of Proposed Amendments to the International Health Regulations: Textual Proposals Made In Subgroup A
on Arts 39 and 48 of the Draft Revision, A/IHR/IGWG/A/Conf.Paper No.2, Add.2, 11 November 2004, 2.
324 IHR 2005, above n.1, Art.43.8.
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in Article 43 of the new IHR that otherwise apply to additional health measures. The Article
43 limitations may (not shall) apply to the implementation of measures concerning travellers
participating in mass congregations. Why the new IHR allows this category of additional
measures to escape the scientific, trade-related and human rights requirements applied to
all other additional health measures is not clear.
IV.C.iv. Rejections and reservations to the new IHR
The new IHR are a treaty under international law and thus cannot legally bind a State until
that State gives its sovereign consent to be bound to the revised Regulations. 325 As noted
earlier, regulations adopted pursuant to Article 21 of the WHO Constitution, such as the
new IHR, become legally binding on all WHO Member States that have not rejected the regulations, or formulated reservations to them, within a specified period of time. 326 For the new
IHR, the time period in which rejections or reservations must be made is 18 months from the
date the Director-General notified WHO Member States that the new IHR were adopted.327
The new IHR contains a complex procedure with respect to reservations that differs significantly from the equivalent procedure in the old IHR. Under the old IHR, the WHA had
to accept all reservations to ensure that reservations did not substantially detract from the
character and purpose of the IHR.328 The new IHR permit reservations that are not incompatible with the object and purpose of the revised Regulations. 329 The new IHR establish a
process for determining whether a reservation is compatible with the object and purpose of
the Regulations. The first step involves review of the reservation by WHO Member States (if
the new IHR are not yet in force) or States Parties (if the IHR have entered into force). 330 If
less than one-third of the relevant States objects to the reservation, the reservation is deemed
to be accepted (and thus compatible with the object and purpose of the new IHR); and the
33 1
new IHR can enter into force for the reserving State subject to the accepted reservation.
If one-third or more of the relevant States objects to the reservation and the reserving State
does not withdraw the reservation, then the reservation is submitted to the WHA for consideration. 332 If the WHA, by majority vote, objects to the reservation on the ground that
it is not compatible with the object and purpose of the new IHR, the reservation shall
not be accepted.333 The new IHR do not enter into force for the State making the reservation
334
unless it withdraws the reservation.

325 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, above n.43, Art.34.
326 WHO Const., Art.22.
327 IHR 2005, above n.1, Art.59.1.
328 IHR 1969, above n.16, Art.88.1.
329 IHR 2005, above n.1, Art.62.I.
330 Ibid., Art.62.4.
331 Ibid., Art.62.5.
332 Ibid., Art.62.9. The reserving State can request the views of the Review Committee and such views shall be submitted to the WHA in connection with its consideration of the reservation. Ibid., Art.62.8-62.9.
333 Ibid., Art.62.9.
334 Ibid., Art.62.9.
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The procedure on reservations provides guidance in two areas that have been unsettled in
customary international law on treaties. First, the new IHR provide a means of determining
whether a reservation is incompatible with the object and purpose of a treaty. Secondly, the
revised Regulations establish what the legal effect is for a State that has formulated a reservation that is incompatible with the object and purpose of the new IHR (i.e. the State
335
does not become a State Party until it withdraws its reservation).
IV.D. The synthesis theme and the new IHR
The old IHR and prior manifestations of the classical regime constituted efforts to balance
trade and public health goals, but the regime's narrow scope meant that the trade-public
health balancing was limited for both trade and public health. The old IHR did not
cover many pathogens that move in international trade and travel or any substances that
may cause non-communicable diseases, producing a shallow public health profile. Similarly,
the old IHR's minimization of interference with international traffic was superficial from a
trade perspective because such minimization caught only trade potentially affected by
cholera, plague and yellow fever. One could not describe the old IHR as an impressive
synthesis of trade and public health objectives.
The new IHR contain, however, a synthesis project for global health governance of
impressive proportions. One of the most radical substantive changes in the new IHR is
the integration of multiple objectives into a single governance framework. The framework
represents integrated governance for the purpose of achieving global health security. The
theme of synthesis identifies this governance integration as one of the most important
features of the new IHR.
In contrast to the limited international governance footprint of the old IHR, the new IHR
construct a synthesized approach to global governance in terms of actors, threats and objectives. The new IHR integrate governmental, intergovernmental and non-governmental actors
through the provisions on surveillance. Each category of actors is vital to global surveillance
working effectively. The fundamental importance of surveillance to public health makes
this integration very significant and reveals the conclusion that the State-centric approach
to surveillance has become a relic of the past.
Synthesized governance is also apparent in connection with public health threats. The new
IHR interpret health protection broadly by extending coverage to chemical and radiological
threats as well as microbial ones. This approach overcomes the traditional "stove piping" of
international legal regimes into those that address infectious diseases, chemical and radiological accidents or emergencies and WMD. The new IHR do not supersede or interfere with
those other regimes but draw them together as allies in the pursuit of global health security.
The new IHR promote synthesized governance in the area of policy objectives also. The
old IHR attempted to integrate public health (narrowly conceived) and trade objectives but
only in a very limited way. The new IHR integrate public health (broadly conceived) with
335 Gerald Schatz, International Health Regulations: New Mandate for Scientific Cooperation, ASIL Insight, 2
August 2005 (www.asil.org/insights/2005/08/insights05O8O2.html).
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trade, security, environmental and human rights objectives. This integration reveals a perspective in which public health is at the centre of a complex web of political, economic
and social interests and values. The best way to manage this complex web is to understand
the interdependence of these objectives and construct a governance framework sensitive to
the interdependence, which is what the new IHR achieves.
The synthesized governance sought by the new IHR also reveals how much public health
matters to governance nationally and globally in the twenty-first century. This insight resonates with arguments and conclusions reached in other efforts, including the formulation
of the Millennium Development Goals, 33 6 the efforts to place health at the centre of development policy337 and the increasing importance of public health to national and international security.3 3 8 In many respects, these various endeavors suggest that effective public
health has become an indicator of "good governance" in the post-Cold War world. 9
This outlook on public health and governance could never have arisen from the classical
regime in any of its iterations. The new IHR contribute to the elevation of public health
as a marker for the quality of twenty-first-century governance pursued by States, intergovernmental organizations and non-governmental organizations.
The theme of synthesized governance also points to another significant difference between
the classical regime and the new IHR. The classical regime reflected the traditional use of
international law by States to address discreet, specific problems affecting the relations
between States. The integration of multiple actors, threats and policy objectives in the
new IHR projects qualities more often associated with constitutional than international
law. Constitutional frameworks engage multiple public and private actors in the simultaneous pursuit of numerous political, economic and social ends in hopefully balanced
and sustainable ways. In constitutional systems, governments have a primary responsibility
to protect and promote the public's health, 340 but the pursuit of public health is embedded
336 Three of the eight Millennium Development Goals adopted in 2000 by the United Nations are specific health
objectives: reducing child mortality, improving maternal health and reducing the burden of HIV/AIDS and
other diseases. Four of the five remaining Millennium Development Goals concern key social determinants
of health: poverty, education, gender equality and the environment. See Millennium Development Goals
(www.un.org/millenniumgoals/). See also World Health Organization, Achievement of Health-Related Millennium Development Goals: Report by the Secretariat, A58/5, 13 May 2005.
337 See, e.g. Commission on Macroeconomics and Health, Macroeconomics and Health: Investing in Health for
Economic Development (2001).
338 A More Secure World, above n.184; In Larger Freedom, above n.4.
339 David P. Fidler, Germs, Governance and Global Public Health in the Wake of SARS, 113 Journal of Clinical
Investigation (2004), 799, 802-03 (arguing that public health has become, like democracy and the rule of law,
an indicator of good governance). On the relationship of public health and global governance in the twenty-first
century, see also Fidler, above nn.8, 108; Lawrence 0. Gostin, World Health Law: Toward a New Conception
of Global Health Governance for the 21st Century, 5 Yale Journal of Health Policy, Law and Ethics (2005),
413; Allyn L. Taylor, Governing the Globalization of Public Health, 32 Journal of Law, Medicine and
Ethics (2004), 500; Obijiofor Aginam, Between Isolationism and Mutual Vulnerability: A South-North Perspective on Global Governance of Epidemics in an Age of Globalization, 77 Temple LR (2004), 297; Obijiofor
Aginam, Globalization of Infectious Diseases, International Law and the World Health Organization: Opportunities for Synergy in Global Governance of Epidemics, 11 New England JICL (2004), 59.
340 Lawrence 0. Gostin, Public Health Law: Power, Duty, Restraint (2000), 4 ("Public health activities are a special
responsibility of the government").
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in a larger governance context that requires equilibrium among various objectives. The classical regime contained a limited connection between public health and international trade
and travel, but it did not relate in any way to broader health, security, environmental or
human rights objectives. The new IHR reflect both the broad governance responsibility of
public health and the complex nature of fulfilling that responsibility in harmony with
other governance objectives. The new IHR are not "global constitutional law", but the
synthesized governance they promote represents an approach never seen before in the use
of international law for public health purposes.

V. Back to the future? Concerns regarding the future of the new
IHR
This article has endeavoured to demonstrate how different the new IHR are from the international approach to control of international disease spread that prevailed in past decades. In
addition, the article attempted to communicate why these differences in the new IHR matter
for global health governance. Adoption of the historic new IHR does not, however, guarantee
that this novel international legal regime will be effective or successful. This part raises some
problems and issues that confront the new IHR with a difficult future.
Anticipation of the implementation of the new IHR might be tempered by the realization
that previous innovations in international law relating to public health have not fared
particularly well. The governance innovations formulated in the WHO Constitution concerning the adoption of regulations, through which the IHR were originally promulgated,
proved in hindsight not to have had much traction for international infectious disease
control because WHO Member States did not use such innovations for decades to keep
the IHR relevant to the threats infectious diseases posed.
The proclamation of the human right to health and its later appearance in human rights
treaties has been, and remains, the source of normative inspiration and commitment in
global health policy341 but it has suffered, and continues to suffer, from weaknesses and controversies, including continued arguments about what exactly the right means. 342 These
difficulties do not mean that the right to health is an international legal fiction, but they
suggest that the revolutionary concept of this right has not been matched by equally revolutionary results on the ground.
The protection of human health through international environmental law represents
another governance innovation, the actual impact of which on global public health has
341 See, e.g. Declaration of Alma Ata, above n.51; Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, General
Comment No. 14: The Right to the Highest Attainable Standard of Health, E/C.12/2000/4, 4 July 2000; Paul
Hunt, Report of the Special Rapporteur: The Right of Everyone to the Enjoyment of the Highest Attainable
Standard of Physical and Mental Health, UN ESCOR, 59th Sess., Agenda Item 10, UN Doc. E/CN.4/
2003/58. 13 February 2003; Paul Hunt, Report of the Special Rapporteur: The Right of Everyone to the
Enjoyment of the Highest Attainable Standard of Physical and Mental Health, UN ESCOR, 60th Sess.,
Agenda Item 10, UN Doc. E/CN.4/2004/49, 16 February 2004.
342 Hunt (2003), above n.34 1, para.39 (commenting on the uncertainty surrounding the meaning of the right to
health).
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been, at best, modest. The crisis in emerging and re-emerging infectious diseases in the 1990s
and early 2000s illustrates that international environmental law has not had much effect on
environmental degradation that feeds into the resurgence of microbial pathogens and their
disease vectors. More success for international environmental law may be located in areas
involving non-communicable diseases, such as the international transport of hazardous
wastes and pesticides, and the depletion of the ozone layer.
The public health controversies concerning the WTO provide some indication that the
innovation in the relationship between international law and public health created by the
WTO's establishment has not been universally welcomed. The major debates have
focused, generally speaking, on how much policy space the implementation of WTO agreements leaves for governments to protect and promote public health. The WTO agreements
contain no affirmative public health obligations, which mean these agreements have little
technical relevance to what States actually do with the policy space they have.
The WTO's creation and the controversies that have surrounded it have, ironically, contributed significantly to public health's increased political importance in world affairs today.
The WTO's existence has done more to increase the political profile of public health globally
than almost anything else in the history of international health co-operation. But this new
political importance for public health does not necessarily mean that public health now
343
carries the same influence as trade interests in international politics.
Whether the new IHR will fare any better than these examples of previous innovations in
international law's relationship with public health remains, of course, to be seen, but these
examples temper one's expectations for what the new IHR might be able to achieve in terms
of global public health. WHO led a successful global effort against SARS in 2003 and a
global response against avian influenza in 2004-05 without the revised IHR being completed and WHO's efforts against future dangerous outbreaks might not be successful,
even with the new IHR in place.
Four factors may cut against the new IHR's effectiveness. First, the new IHR do not
address directly the many underlying factors that give rise to global public health
threats. 344 The strategy of global health security is essentially a defensive, reactive strategy
because it seeks to ensure that States are prepared to detect and respond to public health
threats and emergencies of international concern. The strategy does not require States go
on the offensive against the factors that lead to disease emergence and spread. The new
IHR are rules for global disease triage rather than global disease prevention.
Secondly, State Party compliance with the new IHR is not assured simply because the new
IHR are an historic development in the relationship between international law and public
health. Non-compliance by States Parties helped bury the old IHR and significant levels
of non-compliance with the new IHR could have a similar corrosive effect. WHO's new
authorities with respect to surveillance, particularly its ability to access non-governmental
343 Ellen R. Shaffer, Howard Waitzkin, Joseph Brenner and Rebecca Jasso-Aguilar, Global Trade and Public
Health, 95 American Journal of Public Health (2005), 23 (arguing that "[plublic health organizations are
only beginning to grapple with trade-related threats to global health").
344 For analysis of these factors, see Microbial Threats to Health, above n.78, 53 -147.
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sources of information, reduce the potential deleterious effect of non-compliance with notification obligations because such non-compliance does not prevent WHO from acting on
epidemiological information it receives from other sources.
Like the old IHR, the new IHR have no compulsory dispute-settlement mechanism
through which non-compliance with obligations on the implementation of health measures
can be addressed. The new IHR's dispute-settlement provisions require voluntary acceptance
by States Parties. 345 Thus, States Parties will face no new compliance mechanisms if they
choose to implement health measures that violate the new IHR, unnecessarily interfere
with international trade or do not accord full respect for the dignity, human rights and fundamental freedoms of persons.
Thirdly, WHO has historically relied more on non-binding recommendations and guidance to its Member States than crafting legally binding obligations and the track record
of WHO Member States adopting and following WHO recommendations is uneven at
best. The provisions in the new IHR that allow WHO to issue temporary and standing recommendations may not generate more compliance with WHO "soft law" than has been the
case historically. WHO's authority to issue temporary recommendations after the DirectorGeneral has declared a public health emergency of international concern may have more
impact in connection with the obligation to notify WHO (because early and transparent
notification might avoid WHO having to resort to temporary recommendations) than it
will in curbing States Parties from applying unwarranted trade and travel restrictions
against States suffering from serious disease events.
Fourthly, the new IHR may have limited impact unless States, particularly the great
powers, commit political and economic capital to making the global health security strategy
work. The new IHR impose duties and responsibilities on States and WHO that require
high-level political support on a sustained basis. The successful handling of the SARS
outbreak demonstrated the importance of such support and commitment. 34 6 In addition,
building the national and global infrastructure to make global health security a reality will
not be cheap, which creates the need for serious and sustained economic investment in
national public health systems and the global mechanisms, such as GOARN, operated by
WHO.
The UN Secretary-General has observed that GOARN is currently only operated on a
shoestring budget and he has called for more investment in global disease surveillance and
response. 347 Fears of avian influenza in Asia developing into a human influenza pandemic
underscore the urgency of the need for investment in surveillance and response capabilities

345 IHR 2005, above n.1, Art.56.
346 Fidler, above n. 108, 149 (quoting WHO as observing that "[o]ne of the most important lessons learned to date
is the decisive power of high-level political commitment to contain an outbreak even when sophisticated control
tools are lacking").
347 In Larger Freedom, above n.4, paras 64, 93. See also Laurie Garrett, A Snail-Like WHO Needs a Shakeup, Los
Angeles Times, 26 May 2005 (noting inadequacies of WHO resources and personnel, particularly the observation that "the entire global alert and response operation for epidemics at the WHO is ... five people, out
of roughly 6,000 employees").
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globally. 34 8 Without such investment, compliance with the new IHR's obligations on developing and strengthening core public health capacities will be poor to nonexistent in many
developing and least-developed countries, creating dangerous holes in the global health
security strategy.
Although money from non-governmental organizations, be they non-profit or for-profit,
will help, the fundamental burden for creating and sustaining global health security falls on
States, especially the developed countries. With financial commitments to global public
health from developed countries already reaching record levels, mainly as part of responses
to the H1V/AIDS pandemic and the health-related Millennium Development Goals, it is
not clear whether sufficient resources over time will be forthcoming to fund the global
health security strategy of the new IHR. Even with funding for global public health now
reaching historic levels, lamentations continue that such funding is insufficient and much
more funding is required, 349 even before one considers the financial resources implementation of the new IHR will require.
Even though the new IHR have a much broader scope than the classical regime, their
impact will still be limited in terms of global public health. In terms of infectious diseases,
whether the new IHR will make any contributions to the fight against the HIV/AIDS pandemic is doubtful. One does not find HIV/AIDS experts and activists in the forefront of
advocacy for revising the IHR,35° perhaps because this international legal reform will not
increase access to antiretroviral treatments, improve prevention programmes, stimulate
vaccine research and development, or reverse the migration of health personnel from developing to developed countries that harms efforts to improve HIV/AIDS (and other health)
policies in the developing world.
Similar observations could be made about on-going struggles with tuberculosis, malaria
and polio. Will the new IHR improve compliance with Directly Observed TherapyShort Course for tuberculosis control, or strengthen anti-malarial programmes and activities
in developing countries? Even though the new IHR list polio as a notifiable disease, 35 1 can
the revised Regulations increase motivations to accelerate vaccination efforts in the polio
eradication campaign when the benefits and incentives for such vaccination efforts are

348 On the challenges presented by avian influenza and pandemic influenza, see World Health Organization, Avian
Influenza: Assessing the Pandemic Threat, WHO/CDS/2005.29, January 2005 and World Health Organization, Strengthening Pandemic Influenza Preparedness and Response: Report by the Secretariat, A58/13, 7
April 2005.
349 In Larger Freedom, above n.4, para.63 (UN Secretary-General arguing that "[t]he overall international response
to evolving pandemics has been shockingly slow and remains shamefully underresourced").
350 The issue of HIV/AIDS-related travel restrictions has, however, been raised in connection with the revision of
the IHR. See HIV/AIDS-Related Travel Restrictions: UNAIDS/IOM Statement and Revision of the International Health Regulations, 9(2) Canadian HIV/AIDS Policy and Law Review (August 2004) (www.aidslaw.
ca) (arguing that travel-related restrictions on persons with HIV or AIDS violated the old IHR). The new IHR
prohibit States Parties from requiring health documents from travellers unless the Regulations or WHO recommendations allow documents to be required. IHR 2005, above n.1, Art.35. The provision allowing States
Parties to implement health measures otherwise prohibited by the revised Regulations does not list Art.35 as
one of the prohibitions to which it applies. Ibid., Art.43.I.(b).
351 Ibid., Annex 2.
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already clearly defined and empirically demonstrated? Similarly, the revised IHR have little,
if any, relevance to major and growing global non-communicable disease problems, including diseases related to tobacco consumption and to obesity. 352 As bold and different as the
strategy of global health security is, it does not address significant public health concerns
around the world.

VI. Conclusion
The adoption of the new IHR constitutes a seminal event in the history of the relationship
between international law and public health. The revised Regulations contain an approach to
global disease surveillance and response radically different from anything previously seen in
international law on public health. Analysed against the history of the classical regime, the
new IHR send powerful messages about how human societies should think about and collectively govern their vulnerabilities to serious, acute disease events in the twenty-first
century. These messages communicate the need to shift from traditional, State-centric
approaches that balanced parochial or imperial economic and public health objectives in a
very limited way toward an expanded governance strategy that integrates multiple threats,
actors and objectives in a flexible, forward-looking and universal manner.
The world conceived in the international sanitary conventions, the ISR and the old IHR
has long since been transformed by breath-taking technological developments, earth-shaking
political upheavals and border-breaking economic globalization. The revised IHR perceive a
new world forming, in which global health security is a fundamental governance challenge
for all humanity from the local to the global level. The world of global health security is one
in which governments, intergovernmental organizations and non-State actors collaborate in a
"new way of working" 353 by contributing toward a common goal through science, technology and law rather than through anarchical competition for power.
This vision is not a vision of a world without disease. We cannot lawyer diseases out of
human societies by radically changing the IHR. Global health security's premise is that diseases will keep threatening human health. Global health security's promise is that governance
of disease threats can remove the dead hand of the classical regime and wield effectively the
new way of working through the new IHR.

352 See Robert Beaglehole and Derek Yach, Globalisation and the Prevention and Control of Non-Communicable
Disease: The Neglected Chronic Diseases of Adults, 362 The Lancet (2003), 903.
353 David L. Heymann, Testimony at Hearing on Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome Threat before the Committee
on Health, Education, Labor and Pensions of theUS Senate, 7 April 2003 (reflecting on the management of
2
SARS and arguing that
"[iln the 1stcentury there is a new way of working").

